Values, immediate and contributory, and their interrelation

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Book TP £~

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY STUDIES
IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

VALUES

IMMEDIATE AND CONTRIBUTORY

AND THEIR INTERRELATION

VALUES

IMMEDIATE AND

CONTRIBUTORY

AND THEIR INTERRELATION

By

MAURICE PI CARD, Ph.D.

Lecturer in Philosophy in Barnard College

THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS

32 Waverly Place, New York City

1920

Copyright 1920, by
The New York Univeesity Press

THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS

COMMITTEE OF PUBLICATION

Arthur Huntington Nason, Ph.D., Chairman
Director of the Press

Earle Brownell Babcock, Ph.D.

Harold Dickinson Senior, M.B., Sc.D., F.R.C.S.

n»3

KENNEBEC JOURNAL PRESS, AUGUSTA, MAINE

PREFACE

IT would seem that an apology is due from
me to Professor W. M. Urban for not
having discussed his significant contribu-
tion to value-philosophy, entitled, Valuation, Its
Nature and Laws. My omission is not due to
any failure to recognize that Professor Urban
is, in this country, the most eminent repre-
sentative of a large school of value-philosophers,
among whom are A. Meinong, C. V. Ehrenfels,
and G. Simmel. My reason for not discussing
their views in the present work is similar to that
which prompted me to pass by Miinsterberg's
The Eternal Values. Here are two schools of
value-philosophy with presuppositions radically
different from my own. That school which
Professor Urban so well represents finds the
locus of value in the "worth-fundamental," dis-
covered by an analysis of mental life. Miinster-
berg finds value in the region of the human will,
and he believes that value implies an over-
personal, metaphysically absolute will. Both
find value primarily to be a quality which colors
certain mental states — Miinsterberg believes
that it points toward an objective " Oversell"
In contrast to this subjective point of de-

vi PREFACE

parture, I have treated value as relational, occur-
ring in definite situations. I have used the
psychological basis of values not as the sum and
substance of valuation, but as a description of
one term of value-relations, the other term, that
of the environment, calling for equal attention.
Thus I have been able to avoid the acrostic phil-
osophy of the value-psychologists, which tends
in the direction of epistemological realism, and
the lack of concreteness incidental to it. I may
note, however, that Professor Urban considers
briefly, in the last chapter of his book, some of
the problems which I discuss in detail.

To Professor Herman Harrell Home of New
York University, I am indebted for numerous
suggestions and for a final reading of the proof;
and to Professor Arthur Huntington Nason,
Director of the New York University Press,
for critical oversight of publication. Above
all, however, my gratitude is due to Professor
Dickinson S. Miller of General Theological
Seminary, for his kindness in reading my man-
uscript and making many helpful suggestions
as to the method of treatment of my subject.

M. P.
New York City,
January 31, 1920.

CONTENTS

Introduction

PART I

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES

Chapter I. Two Classes of Values 7

Values as means or 'given as good,'
7. — Their psychological basis in cog-
nition and feeling, 9. — Independent
character of contributory values, 13. —
Objective and subjective, 14. — Ques-
tionable status of logical, moral, and
aesthetic values, 15. — Distinction be-
tween values and value- judgments, 16.

Chapter II. Truth and Immediate Value . . 20
Verification vs. recognition, 20. — Rick-
ert's argument, 21. — Metaphysics and
epistemology, 24. — Truth a matter of
inference, not simple affirmation, 25. —
Rickert's psychologizing tendency, 26.
— Various oppositions, 28.

Chapter III. The Interrelation op Values

with Respect to Their Origin. . 31
Values not dependent upon presence
of judgment, 32. — Standpoints of the
agent and the observer, 33.— Value and
the earliest stage of consciousness, 36. —

vii

viii VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Presence of interest the criterion of
presence of value, 38. — Biological con-
comitants of the earliest value-situation,
39. — Values from the observer's stand-
point all contributory, 43. — Introspec-
tive and sympathetic methods, 44. —
Earliest stage of the standpoint of
the individual, 45. — Introspective deter-
mination of values of this stage, 46. —
Values in the earliest stages of con-
sciousness, 48. — Sensations and feeling-
attitudes, 48. — Two directions of the
development of conscious activity, 50.

Chapter IV. The Interrelation op Values

with Respect to Knowledge . . 54
Judgments as values and judgments
of values, 54. — The value of acts of
judgment, 57. — Content of judgments
and their future usefulness, 59. — True
judgments and their value, 61. — Value
of false judgments, 66. — Degrees of
contributory value, 69. — Value of theo-
retical judgments, 73. — Limits of the
discussion of judgments of values, j6.
Origin of immediate judgments, 78. —
Origin of contributory judgments, 80. —
Tendency of contributory judgments
to become independent of particular in-
dividual needs, 82.

Chapter V. The Interrelation op Values
with Respect to Their Co-exis-
tence 85

CONTENTS ix

Different uses of the term 'environ-
ment', 85. — Biological and psychological
uses, 88. — Difference between the bio-
logical viewpoint and that of instru-
mental pragmatism, 90. — Environment
and perception, 92. — Relevant disputes
about aspects of consciousness, 94. —
Conscious activity related to environ-
ment through cognition and feeling, 97.
Contact with environment through feel-
ing, 99. — Cognitive and affective rela-
tions of conscious activity, 104. — Rela-
tion of mature to primitive conscious
activity, 106. — Sensation as a bridge
between cognition and feeling, no. —
Further deductions, 112.

PART II

WINDELBAND'S THEORY OF NORMS

Chapter VI. Subjective and Objective 119

The place of function in value-rela-
tions, 119. — Are tastes objective or sub-
jective? 121. — Possible existence of
norms, 122. — Attractiveness of theory
of objective immediate values, 124.

Chapter VII. The Theory op Norms 126

I. Kant or Realism? 128

Windelband's contradictory theories,
129. — Norms and natural laws, 130. —
Relation of norms to particular con-
sciousnesses, 132.

x VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

II. Evolution and the Norms 134

Qualitative and quantitative factors,
135. — Their incompatability with the
theory of natural selection, 136.

III. The Parallel between Denken,

Fuklen, and Wollen 137

Falsity of the parallel between Den-
ken and Wollen, 137. — A psychological
scruple, 139.

IV. The Independence of the Norms

of Particular Consciousnesses . . 140
Independence of particular conscious-
nesses not proved for norms, 141. — The
case for parallelism of three realms of
norms, 145. — Evolution of morality
does not presuppose norms of morality,
148. — Supposition of moral and logical
norms unnecessary, 152. — Aesthetic
appreciations and the law of sur-
vival, 153.

V. Freedom and Responsibility 155

Freedom said to subsist in determined
processes, 157. — Assumption of auton-
omy on part of the individual, 160. —
Causality, necessity, and responsibility,
162. — Ambiguity in use of the word
'character', 165. — Choice of possible de-
cisions, 166. — Responsibility as a func-
tion of the judgment, 169.

Windelband's General Position . . 172

Conclusion 175

VALUES

IMMEDIATE AND CONTRIBUTORY

AND THEIR INTERRELATION

INTRODUCTION

IN this thesis, I purpose taking as my start-
ing point the general agreement among
writers as to the existence of values be-
longing to two distinct classes, immediate and
contributory. In order to put the distinction
between the two classes beyond question, I shall
limit the class " immediate " to those immediate
values which are agreed to be subjective, i.e.,
dependent for their existence upon some par-
ticular individual who holds them as values.
The propositions, therefore, which I shall as-
sume to be matters of general agreement are,
" There is a class of values which may be named
i contributory \" " All contributory values are
objective." " There is another class of values
which may be termed ' immediate \" " Some
immediate values are subjective."

Having distinguished two classes of values
as subject-matter for discussion, I proceed to
treat of their interrelations. But, before this
can be done effectually, it is found to be neces-
sary to disprove a theory which, if true, would
render the distinction between immediate and

4 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

contributory values of slight importance. It
has been held that the values known as con-
tributory are dependent for their validity upon
certain a priori immediate values because all
truth is said to rest upon immediate recognition
of its presence. I therefore devote a chapter
to disproving this theory.

With two classes of values of unquestioned
distinction, I next discuss their interrelation
with reference to their origin, with reference
to knowledge, and with reference to their co-
existence.

Part II examines immediate values with a
view to demonstrating that there are no ob-
jective immediate values. This result confirms
the validity of the initial distinction between
objective-contributory and subjective-immediate
values, and carries the proposition " Some im-
mediate values are subjective " to the wider
application of the proposition " It cannot be
proved that there are any immediate values
which are not subjective."

PART I
THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES

CHAPTER I

TWO CLASSES OF VALUES

THE method to be pursued, as stated in
the introduction, is to begin the dis-
cussion by finding some point of agree-
ment among writers on value. It is not to be
expected that there may be discovered groups
of values to whose clear cut distinctions all
writers will subscribe. It is not unlikely, how-
ever, that there may exist a fundamental dis-
tinction in kind between certain values and cer-
tain other values, and that the points at issue
may be due to differences of opinion as to the
correct assignment of other particular values.
First, I shall point out two radically different
types of value; secondly, I shall indicate the
nature of those values which may not be as-
signed summarily to one of the two classes.

§ i. The distinction which I have in mind
is between contributory or instrumental values
and immediate values. The adjectives " instru-
mental " and " immediate " indicate that the
distinction is a logical one, distinguishing values
as given goods or as means. Contributory

7

8 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

values are not self-sufficient; they look beyond
themselves to some end-in-view. They com-
prise objects that are "good for" something,
or acts that conduce to the attainment of some
specific end. Thus, this pen is good for writ-
ing; apples are good for food. I visit my
physician in order to obtain treatment from
him; he prescribes for me in order that I may
get well. Pen, apples, and the acts of visiting
and treatment are of contributory value.

Immediate values, on the other hand, are
" non-mediate." They do not look forward to
an end, but are intrinsic, self-sufficient. They
are ends-in-themselves in the sense that they
are simply given as good when stated, requiring
neither reference to any object or act beyond
themselves, nor verification of any kind. Of
such character are objects and acts which I like,
demand, admire, approve, wish, want, etc. I
admire a beautiful vase; it thus becomes of
value to me, irrespective of any other vases
that I admire. I disapprove of the act of taking
human life; the act of killing thereby becomes
of negative value to me. Sailing and smoking
are valuable to me.

8 2. The fundamental character of the dis-

TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 9

tinction between immediate and contributory
values will appear when their psychological
basis is taken into account. Observe first that
objects and acts of contributory value demand
for their existence other objects or acts to which
they may be related. They cannot stand alone.
For a government note to be of the value of
ten dollars, the ten dollars must actually exist
somewhere. Apples, considered as good for
food, imply the existence of some suitable diges-
tive apparatus. If my visit to my physician is
to be valuable as a means to getting well, I must
now be capable of improvement in health beyond
my present state. Now, as both contributory
and instrumental values are here spoken of with
reference to man, it is obvious that the psycho-
logical basis of contributory values must be
sought in some aspect of the human mind by
which objects and acts may be related to other
objects and acts. Cognition alone satisfies this
requirement. We may say, therefore, that con-
tributory values are closely associated with
the cognitive aspect of consciousness, where
comparison, memory, and reasoning furnish a
mechanism for relating portions of our ex-
perience.

io VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Immediate values, on the other hand, do not
require relation of two ideas in consciousness.
They are simple, unique, self-sufficing facts.
They are matters of taste, and " de gustibus
non disputandum." What is the importance of
the cognitive aspect of conscious activity with
respect to such values? Must I know them in
order to have them? Not any more than that
the leopard must know that he has spots in
order to have them. Knowledge of values,
therefore, is quite distinct from values them-
selves, and we shall do well always to bear this
fact in mind.

If cognition is merely incidental to immediate
values, the psychological basis of immediate
values must be sought in some aspect of con-
sciousness other than the cognitive aspect. There
remain, in the popular division, the fields of will
and feeling. The words " like," " demand,"
"want," "admire," "approve," "wish," etc.,
which describe the type of relation that exists
between the individual and the objects or acts
which he immediately values, are all expressive
of feeling. It is also noteworthy that, if the
feeling is toward an object or act which the
individual is not possessing or doing at the

TWO CLASSES OF VALUES n

time, there is also frequently present an impulse
to gain possession of the object or to do the act.
If I am sufficiently eager to sail, I am impelled
to go down to the lake to get the boat ready.
If my liking for peanuts affects me deeply, I
am likely to go out and buy some. It appears,
therefore, that immediate values are also closely
associated with the will-aspect of consciousness,
and this can be said without committing oneself
to any particular theory as to the nature of that
will-aspect. In the case of contributory values,
however, there is a hypothetical characteristic
which makes their relation to will quite differ-
ent. Apples are good for food if I am hungry.
My pen is good for writing when I want to
write. In these examples, there is no impulse
aroused by the act of contributory valuation;
I may put the object or the act valued to service
whenever a suitable occasion is presented, but
the object or act will not itself create the occa-
sion. I may conclude, therefore, that will and
feeling are peculiarly associated with immediate
values, and cognition with contributory values.
§ 3. I must not leave this preliminary con-
sideration of the psychological basis of value
without a caution and a deduction. The cau-

12 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

tion is that the assignment of two classes of
values to different fields of psychological mani-
festation must not be held to imply that the
individual ever acts exclusively in any one
" field " of consciousness. Cognition, feeling,
and will are aspects of a conscious activity
which is undivided. The distinction with refer-
ence to value is one of emphasis rather than
one of division. More than that, the distinction
implies that we human beings, in our discussion
and discrimination of values, recognize that we
value things in different ways, according as we
think, feel, or do them. But this is not to deny
the presence of a minimum of feeling and im-
pulse necessary to the presence of a thought.
There are all gradations of emphasis of cog-
nition, feeling, and will in conscious activity,
and it is not unlikely that we may find situa-
tions of conscious activity in which both classes
of value are simultaneously present. The inter-
relation of the two classes is, in fact, a subject
of future discussion in this thesis. At this
juncture, it is necessary only to point out that
I do not mean to isolate any "field" of con-
sciousness in the act, but only to emphasize that
the two classes of value refer exclusively to
different aspects of conscious activity.

TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 13

The deduction which I wish to make is that
contributory values have a measure of inde-
pendence of any one individual, which imme-
diate values cannot claim. Two facts make
this evident: (a) The cognitive function by its
process of comparison and relation of ideas one
to another makes contributory values independ-
ent of a particular time or moment in the activ-
ity of the individual. If my umbrella is good
for keeping off the rain, it is good for that
purpose when next it rains, be it today, next
Wednesday, or next month. I may verify con-
tributory values. I may find out what my um-
brella is good for. (b) The cognitive function
has developed the convenient method of expres-
sion of ideas of one individual to another by
means of speech. It is conceivable that I might
demonstrate the use of my umbrella to a soaked
friend by gestures, but words greatly facilitate
the process. In this way, contributory values
are made independent not only of any special
moment in the life of an individual, but also of
any particular individual. This is in marked
contrast with immediate values: the communi-
cation of my likes and dislikes to my neighbor
is a matter of some difficulty, and sympathetic

14 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

feeling always lacks something of the flavor of
the original experience.

§ 4. With some care, the terms " objective "
and " subjective " may be used to signify the
distinction between immediate and contributory
values. The independence which has just been
recognized as characteristic of contributory
values makes " objective " an appropriate des-
ignation for them. If such values pass as coin
among the members of a community, they must
cling to the object rather than to the persons
who employ them. This is not to say, however,
that they would be values at all apart from the
relation of the objects to individuals who value
them, but they may be called " objective " in
deference to the fact that they do not depend
for their existence upon any particular member
of a community.

§ 5. The term " subjective," in contrast, is
applicable to at least some immediate values, in
view of the fact that they cannot exist apart
from the conscious activity of some particular
individual.

§ 6. The second task which I set for myself
at the beginning of the chapter was that of
indicating certain classes of values over whose

TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 15

position there is some dispute. The current
differences of opinion are nearly all due to one
fact, namely, that it is possible to use the cog-
nitive function of conscious activity to express
in thought and language facts of immediate
value.

As we have seen, it is necessary that there
be a cognitive minimum in order to be conscious
of an immediate value. This element, however,
at first at a minimum, may grow to the very
limit of cognitive development and attain ex-
pression in the judgment. If apples are of
immediate value, I may think of them as such,
and I may make the judgment, " I like apples."
Some writers now argue thus : " I like apples "
is a judgment. Judgments are capable of veri-
fication. But immediate values do not demand
verification. Therefore judgments of immedi-
ate values are immediately true. It is further
argued that truth, not only of value-judgments
but also all truth, is of immediate value, because,
it is claimed, in judgment there is always an
element of approval or disapproval on the part
of the judging individual. Clearly, therefore,
truth is a value whose assignment is in dispute,
if, indeed, it be a value at all.

16 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Again, in the judgment " I admire the vase,"
there is expressed a fact of immediate value.
Suppose that, in my admiration, I pronounce it
beautiful. Is the beauty a quality of the vase,
or only my feeling toward it? If the beauty
is in the vase, there must be some standard of
beauty outside my consciousness, and the imme-
diate value of appreciation of the beautiful will
not be subjective, but objective. The place of
aesthetic values, therefore, is in dispute.

Again, in judging an action to be good, am
I expressing only my feeling toward it, or is my
feeling governed by the presence of an objective
standard of moral value which I instinctively
recognize? Is it true that there is nothing
good or bad, but thinking makes it so? Or is
there a moral standard, quite independent of
my sentiments, which is valid for all time? The
place of moral values, therefore, is in dispute.

§ 7. To discuss these disputed points will be
a part of what follows. At this point, however,
it is suitable to distinguish carefully between a
fact of immediate value, and the expression of
that same fact in a judgment about immediate
value. My feeling toward the vase is quite a
distinct and separate thing from the judgment

TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 17

" The vase is beautiful." The one does not
necessitate the other. I might like the vase,
and never put my liking into words; or I might
say, " The vase, no doubt, is beautiful, but I
feel no liking for it." Judgments of immediate
values, therefore, do not derive immediacy from
the immediate values which they state. The
psychological basis outlined earlier in the chap-
ter must be preserved. Judgments, even judg-
ments of immediate value, since they fall within
the field of cognition, must be classed with con-
tributory values, if they are values at all. And
strange as it may appear, the judgment that a
vase is immediately beautiful will be found to
be of contributory value.1

Discussion of the possible existence of ob-
jective moral and aesthetic standards may be
postponed to a later chapter. But discussion
of the status of truth may not be postponed,
because, if truth should be found to be imme-
diate and antecedent to judgment, the distinc-
tion between immediate and contributory values
would be of slight consequence. There would
then be too little separation between certain
values with reference to the cognitive function

1 Cf. page 58.

18 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

and certain other values with reference to the
feeling-function of conscious activity to make
the distinction worth while. My next task,
therefore, is that of discussing the place of
truth in a classification of values.

The substance of this chapter may be sum-
marized as follows:

§ i. It is generally agreed that there are two
groups of values which are distinct and separate
and which may be named immediate and con-
tributory values.

The distinction is a logical one: contributory
values are means to ends; immediate values are
given as good.

§ 2. The psychological basis of contributory
values is the cognitive aspect of conscious activ-
ity; that of immediate values is the feeling-
aspect, often joined with the will-aspect.

§ 3. It is not implied that any aspect of con-
sciousness functions without the presence of the
other aspects.

§ 4. " Objective " applied to contributory
values means that they do not depend for their
existence upon a particular individual. " Sub-
jective " applied to immediate values means

TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 19

that they do depend for their existence upon
some particular individual.

§ 5. It is generally agreed that contributory
values are objective in this sense; and that some
immediate values are subjective.

§ 6. Whether there are objective immediate
values, in the realms of truth, beauty, and mor-
ality, is a disputed question.

§ 7. Confusion between the classes of con-
tributory and immediate values has been due
largely to the fact that it is possible to make
judgments as to immediate values.

CHAPTER II

TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE

A CHIEF distinction between immediate
and contributory values is that the
latter admit of verification, while the
former do not. If a friend tells me that a cer-
tain brand of soap is good for taking off dirt,
I can very quickly find out for myself whether
what he says is true or not. I can discover
whether soap is contributory to the end of cleans-
ing. But if my friend tells me that he likes a
perfume, I cannot verify the immediate value of
his liking. He simply likes it, and it is valuable
to him without any ado. Whether I find it
agreeable, or what his other friends think about
it, makes no difference; for him, it is of imme-
diate value.

Certain writers, however, tell us that the veri-
fication of the soap as contributory to cleansing
is not merely a matter of using it and watching
its effect upon the skin. They say that the
process of trial and observation is of secondary
importance beside recognition of the truth that
soap cleanses. And this recognition, they say,

20

TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 21

has nothing to do with verification, but is based
on a powerful compulsion of the feeling-side of
consciousness to assent to it as true. Truth,
they say, is thus an immediate value.

Now if truth be an immediate value, all those
values which I designated as contributory are,
in the last analysis, immediate, or, at least, based
on immediate values. My whole thesis, on the
other hand, assumes that there are the two
classes of values, immediate and contributory,
and that they are coordinate in rank. It be-
comes of first importance, therefore, to disprove
the theory that truth is an immediate value.

A very subtle psychological argument has
been advanced to prove this theory. The keen-
est piece of analysis in its support has been
made by H. Rickert in his Der Gegenstand der
Erkenntnis.1 It will be profitable to summarize
and criticize Rickert's position.

Starting with the classic conception of truth
as located in the judgment,2 Rickert emphasizes
the practical character of knowledge. He ob-
serves that there is no truth where there is only
a succession of perceptions, and that the fully

1 Rickert, H., Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, Tubingen und
Leipzig, 2 AufL, 1904.

2 Op. tit., 84 ff.

22 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

developed logical judgment appears only when
the individual takes an interest (Anteil) in the
perceptions. He says that affirmation or nega-
tion is logically implied in all judgments which
are held to contain knowledge in the sense of
true knowledge. Thus, knowing is appreci-
ating (Kennen ist Erkennen). But apprecia-
tion has to do only with values; therefore truth
is a value. The value truth is coordinate with
values derived from willing and feeling; that
is, truth is an immediate value. The usual
opposition made between perceptions and judg-
ments, on the one hand, and feeling and willing,
on the other, is false; the true opposition is
between perceiving, on the one hand, and judg-
ments of affirmation and negation together with
feeling and willing, on the other. Affirmation
and negation, since they are expressive of inter-
est, are a kind of approval or disapproval, pleas-
ure or displeasure. Knowing is a process deter-
mined through the feelings. But truth differs
from the appreciation that comes with feelings
other than affirmation or negation, in that the
appreciation that comes with chance feelings
(i.e., immediate values) is unstable, whereas
the feeling that appreciates truth is timeless.

TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 23

A necessity of judgment is here felt, different
from the necessity of perceiving (causal neces-
sity). Necessity of judgment is logical neces-
sity, Sollen, in contradistinction to Mussen.
Sollen precedes Sein in existential judgments,
because Sein is only expressible by a judgment.
Now if this doctrine is sound, it is obvious
that any separation of two classes of values,
one of which excludes the element of judgment,
is vitiated. For Rickert makes the true judg-
ment dependent upon a necessary feeling of
appreciation; that is, he makes of it an imme-
diate value. According to his theory, the truth
of my judgment " The tree is green " is ground-
ed in a transcendental Sollen which compels me
to judge it as green, if I judge at all. There
is an immediate feeling of affirmation, appreci-
ation, recognition, which requires me to say
" green " rather than blue or red. Every fact
implies a judgment.3 In the preceding chapter,4
I made the distinction between facts of imme-
diate value and judgment concerning the truth
or falsity of these facts. According to Rickert,
I must have fallen into that " Positivismus, der
die ' Tatsache * und ihre Konst aliening fur das

3 Op. cit., 130.

4 Page 16.

3

24 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

einzige und letzte ansieht, was den Philosophen
kummert" 5 It is necessary, therefore, at this
point to criticize Rickert's position:

§ i. The doctrine that Sein depends upon a
transcendental Sollen, is equivalent to saying
that metaphysics is dependent upon epistemol-
ogy, and many are the objections against such
a position.6 Here it may be remarked that
Rickert, as all others who adopt that standpoint,
does not live up to his doctrine. If it be true,
as he states on p. 130, that existential facts
imply a prior judgment, correct method would
demand the proof of his theory on the basis of
necessary judgments. Such a theory must not
be constructed from any materials outside the
sphere of judgments recognized (appreciated)
as true. What apparently contradicts such a
requirement is to be found on pp. 88-89. ^n
these pages, Rickert distinguishes between the
quaestio facti of psychology and the quaestio
juris of epistemology. He says that psychology
is concerned with Sein, but he adds, " Sieht
man die Feststellung solcher Tatsachen als
Aufgabe der Psychologie an, so muss auch die

5 Rickert. op. cit., 130.

6 Cf. Marvin, W. T., The New Realism, 43-95.

TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 25

Behandlung der Frage nach dem erkenntnis-
theoretischen Wesen des Urteils mit psycho-
logischen Feststellungen beginnen, um dann zu
sehen, welchen Dienst sie fur das Verstdndnis
des logischen Urteilsbe griff es leisten konnen"
This is to say, you must start with certain ex-
istential facts in order to obtain a basis for
consideration of the judgment. Later,7 he says
that it is immaterial whether all judgments, psy-
chologically speaking, contain either an affirma-
tion or a negation, for the epistemological prob-
lem concerns only those which do imply one.
His developed theory, however, claims that all
knowledge (true knowledge — even existential
facts) contains an affirmation or a negation.
What of the facts taken from psychology which
he used to erect his theory? He has assumed
the knowledge of certain facts in order to prove
a theory of the dependence of reality on knowl-
edge. It is an error of method.

§ 2. The position of Rickert, in holding that
existential facts imply judgments, is to the effect
that there are immediate truths. We know
existential truth with existence, and the latter
cannot be regarded as independent of the for-

7 Rickert, op. cit., 96.

26 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

mer. Rickert is not alone in supposing that
there are immediate truths. This theory is held
by Russell 8 and by James, among moderns. In
the case of James, however, perhaps it is more
a question of terminology, as knowledge, in his
use of the word, is not restricted to propositions.

Dewey (in a conversation with the writer)
has brought a cogent argument in criticism of
this doctrine of immediate truths. In the prop-
osition " It is green," a whole background of
experience is presupposed, the comparison of
colors. If the judgment is to be verified, the
use of spectrum analysis will be required. The
truth of the simplest " atomic " proposition,
therefore, is dependent upon a great number of
" molecular " propositions. " It is green " may
be a " snap judgment," associating a particular
phenomenon with others that I have experi-
enced, or it may involve the services of an ex-
pert physicist, as in a law court. In either case,
truth is a matter of inference, and the process
is no simple, compelling affirmation, but a har-
monization with past experience by comparison.

§ 3. If, therefore, truth always involves some
kind of inference, there can be no such thing as

8 Cf. Russell, Bertrand, Scientific Method in Philosophy, 52 ff.

TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 2J

an " immediate truth." But what shall we say
of the affirmation or negation which we are
"compelled" to give to existential judgments?
It seems to me that Rickert has been misled by
his polemic against the object of knowledge
conceived as " independent " of the individual.
He feels that, if this conception is abandoned,
a substitute must be found, not so crude, but
still independent. Thereupon he infers an in-
dependent Sollen from our feeling of necessity
in affirming existential judgments. My criti-
cism here is that the question of what is the
object of knowledge need not be introduced to
account for the affirmation or negation that we
feel compelled to make. We need postulate
only a center of experience, a succession of
phenomena, memory, and association. Affirma-
tion or negation will then be accounted for on
the basis of agreement or disagreement of the
phenomena by comparison in memory. Truth
will then be applicable to those judgments which
state relations that have proved constant. From
the epistemological standpoint, it is wholly naive
to seek an object that compels us to recognize
similarity.

§ 4. Perhaps it may be urged that, in the

28 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

preceding section, terms have been assumed
wrongfully to be given before relations, and
that we have no right to use terms to explain
the judgment, inasmuch as terms themselves
imply existential judgments. My answer to
this objection is: How then does Rickert feel
justified in speaking of an opposition between
perceiving (Vorstellen) and a class comprised
of judgments of affirmation and negation, Fuh-
len, and Wollen? What are perceptions if not
terms? And, if they are existential judgments,
how may they be opposed to judgments? And
how can Rickert say that, when there is only a
succession of perceptions, truth cannot enter?

My conclusion is that affirmation or negation
must not be held to be of more than incidental
importance where the truth of judgments is
concerned, and that its psychological explana-
tion is ultimate.

§ 5. Rickert's correlation of Bejahen oder
Verneinen with Billigen oder Missbilligen and
Gef alien oder Missf alien is crude and super-
ficial. Because there is an " either-or " in the
case of Fuhlen and Wollen which distinguishes
positive and negative immediate values, he con-
cludes, without justification, that the " either-

TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 29

or " of affirmation or negation in Denken is
similar in kind. It is undeniably true that,
when we affirm or deny a proposition, the ele-
ments of will and feeling are present in the
act of affirming or denying. This is to say no
more than that the fields of cognition, feeling,
and activity are never isolated. It is quite
another matter, however, to conclude that feel-
ings determine knowledge.9 The true correla-
tion is, that, in connection with judgments and
feelings and desires, there is a removal of some
kind of opposition; but this is not to say that
the determining factor is one of the elements,
any more than another. It would be just as
warrantable to say that cognition determines all
feelings or all desires. No, there is opposition
that is removed in Fuhlen, Denken, and Wollen,
but the same factor does not operate in each of
the three classes. One would have expected
that Rickert would have hesitated to make
Fuhlen responsible for Erkennen, in view of
his recognition of the timeless 10 character of
the " either-or " of affirmation and negation.
It would seem that this timeless character
should have made it evident to him that the

9 Rickert, op. cit., 106. 10 Op. tit., 112.

30 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

factor of interest X1 on the part of the individual
is entirely incidental to the truth or falsity of
judgments. It is psychological, not logical.

To summarize the arguments, it may be said
that truth is not an immediate value because:

§ i. The theory rests on a false derivation
of metaphysics from epistemology ;

§ 2. Truth, even existential truth, is infer-
ential ;

§ 3. A transcendental Sollen is superfluous,
and unwarranted by the " feeling of the neces-
sity of judgment";

§ 4. The theory does not account for the
existence of perceptions apart from judgment,
though it presupposes them;

§ 5. The theory of the dependence of truth
on the interest of individuals is logically un-
sound.

11 Op. cit., 105.

CHAPTER III

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES
WITH RESPECT TO THEIR ORIGIN

NOW that it has been demonstrated
that truth is not an immediate value,
the way is cleared for discussion of
the interrelations of the two classes of values.
I purpose following an order which might be
called the " natural history of values." I shall
endeavor successively to answer the questions,
" Where do values begin in the development of
conscious life?" "What is their progress in
the course of evolution?" "What happens
when we talk about them ? " and " How are
the two classes related in our daily experi-
ence? " The first part of my discussion, there-
fore, will be biological and psychological, the
second, epistemological, and the third, biological
and psychological.

Before proceeding with the first part of my
task, it will be necessary to describe the stand-
point from which discussion of the origin of
values is possible. Then I shall describe a
series of steps in the development of contribu-
tory and immediate values from the earliest

3i

32 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

stages of conscious activity to the mature, re-
flective consciousness of the educated man.

§ i . It was stated in the first chapter 1 that
knowledge of an immediate value is not neces-
sary to its existence. This thesis bears two
interpretations, both of which are true and
applicable. It may mean : When I like a thing,
I don't have to think or speak of it as a value.
It may also mean: The feeling I have toward
an object that I like is quite distinct from my
knowledge of that feeling. Now these two
interpretations of the independence of immedi-
ate value of knowledge thus express the truths
that (a) the immediate value is independent of
the judgment, and (b) the immediate value is
independent of its being thought. More ex-
plicitly, the latter proposition means that my
actual liking for grapes is different in kind
from my thought about that actual liking.

We may also argue that contributory values
may exist apart from the judgment. Objects
may be valued as means without judging them
to be such. A man may find a branch useful
for raising a stone. We may suppose him to
be so accustomed to raising stones with branches

1 Page io.

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 33

that he gives no thought to the means which he
employs. He simply picks up a stick and uses
it as a lever. Such actions, in which we utilize
past experience habitually without the medium
of judgment, are of every-day occurrence. We
may even use means instinctively, without ever
having made judgment. The baby who searches
for its mother's breast with hands and mouth
is employing the latter as means without under-
standing them to be such. Birds search in-
stinctively for materials out of which to build
their nests. The judgment evidently represents
a very high level in the development of con-
tributory values.

§ 2. In seeking for a standpoint from which
to discuss the origin and development of values,
it is evident that we must go back of the judg-
ment. It is evident that values of both classes
may be present in consciousness without the
presence of judgment. There is a difficulty,
however, that confronts us when we come to
discuss the development of values from the
earliest stage of consciousness. It is not an
epistemological difficulty, but rather a difficulty
of standpoint.

In discussing value, it is quite possible to

34 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

confine oneself to the standpoint of the one
who values. We may consider how much a
man likes or dislikes something, or the value
which he places on certain things, or the use-
fulness of certain articles to him in accomplish-
ing what he aims to accomplish.

On the other hand, it is quite possible to take
the standpoint of the spectator or observer, from
the vantage-ground of the high plane of judg-
ment. Then we may point out that certain
things or actions were valuable to the man,
were to his advantage. He may quite accident-
ally have engaged room and board at a house
where one who was to become his lifelong friend
was staying. We may say that his coming to
that house was a valuable action on his part,
in view of the good fortune that came to him
later from the friendship. We may say that
the value which contributed most to Henry's
success was his up-bringing in a home of cul-
ture. In these cases, the values of which we
speak are means to definite ends, but they are
means to ends of which the observer, not the
agent, is thinking. From the standpoint of the
agent, they are simply causes leading to effects.
This is indeed the difference between a con-

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 35

tributory value and a cause: to be of contribu-
tory value, the element of interest must be
added. And this interest may be that of the
agent or of the spectator.

If it appear that the distinction just drawn is
confined to contributory value, observe also that
immediate value was seen to be independent of
its being thought.2 I very much doubt whether
any one will claim that the feelings of a man
when he was a baby and could not understand
them, were more than mechanical. One would
hardly say that they were the same in signifi-
cance as the likes and dislikes of later years.
And yet, from our standpoint, we can look down
and say that the infantile pleasures and pains
were exhibitions of felt goods as much as the
likes and dislikes of later life. We are again
confronted with the distinction between the
standpoints of the agent and the observer.

What point of view are we to adopt in the
discussion of the origin and development of
values? That of the observer, surely, for our
subject in this aspect reaches back long before
ideation reached perfection. And yet we must
bear the distinction in mind, for we shall dis-

2 Page 32.

36 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

cover that two equally reasonable interpreta-
tions of certain situations are made harmonious
only by being shown to proceed from two differ-
ent points of view. This preliminary word on'
standpoint, therefore, is in the nature of a cau-
tion and a warning.

§ 3. It is quite obvious that the meaning of
the earliest stage of consciousness in terms of
value can be discussed only from the standpoint
of the observer. There could be neither a felt
good nor an instrument directed toward an end,
where no consciousness was present. What do
we mean when we speak of a value in connec-
tion with the appearance of the earliest stage of
consciousness? We cannot mean a felt good,
for our whole process of observation is bound
up with judgment on our part. We can only
mean that the appearance of the earliest stage
of consciousness was valuable to an end which
we have in view, viz., the development of con-
scious life. It may be said, therefore, that,
from the observer's standpoint, the earliest
stage of consciousness, whatever may have been
the nature of its elements, was of contributory
value to the developing organism.

§ 4. This is not the place to frame a general

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 37

theory of the origin of consciousness. It is
necessary, however, that we examine the origin
of the earliest stage to such an extent that we
may learn what element there is in it to cause
us to ascribe value to the stage. Perhaps it
may be said that it is sufficient that conscious-
ness led to the creation of value on the part of
the individual himself, and this is a true answer.
But we may inquire further: what are the con-
ditions of the earliest stage of consciousness
which cause us to recognize it as a means to
the appearance of value in the individual him-
self? Perhaps there are general conditions ap-
pearing which are biological concomitants of all
values. Unless some such thing be found to be
true, we might say that all evolution in the
organic world was of contributory value with
respect to the development of conscious life,
and value would thereby be indistinguishable
from causation viewed anthropocentrically. It
is, of course, permissible for the spectator to
look at the whole universe from the standpoint
of man; an individual human being may even
consider all past progress in every sphere of
development as focussed on the great event of
his appearance in the world. But such a way

38 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

of thinking would be regarded justly as one-
sided, in view of the existence of so many other
human standpoints. And so we must look upon
man as man, and life as life, and not commit
ourselves to an evaluation of the universe which
will neglect the claims of other entities.

If we are right, therefore, in ascribing con-
tributory value to the earliest stage of conscious-
ness, there must be some aspect of the causal
elements of the situation which is of interest to
the development of consciousness. The observer
will here assume the standpoint of consciousness
itself. He might say, " I am conscious activity.
When the causal nexus brought me into being,
what were the factors that were responsible for
my appearance? I shall regard these as of con-
tributory value to my very existence.,,

It should be observed that an earliest value
of the kind that I have described will be, by its
very nature, not an individual element of the
causal chain, or even several individual elements ;
it will rather be a certain situation that occurs
in the course of evolution. This situation will
not be identical with the sum of all the factors
concerned in the event; it will rather be a selec-
tion of those factors which characterize the

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 39

complete situation as being conscious, not un-
conscious.

To recapitulate: we are seeking a situation
which is marked by interest, as contrasted with
previous situations which do not contain this.
This situation will be the earliest contributory
value from the standpoint of consciousness, as
interpreted by a spectator.

If we attempted to describe the whole situa-
tion that marks the transition from the uncon-
scious to the conscious, we should be trying to
solve a problem which has baffled psychologists
for centuries. This is not our task, let me
repeat. We seek a minor situation, the point
at which we spectators see interest to enter.

Whatever may be the ultimate factors which
distinguish the presence of life from its absence,
it is certain that, in the lowest forms of life,
we have a substance of highly complex chemical
structure which is extremely sensitive to con-
tact. This substance, protoplasm, is capable of
reacting to a variety of stimuli. As long as
the reactions are separate events, unrelated to
previous reactions in more than a mechanical
way, we cannot speak of value in connection
with the process. It is when the living structure

40 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

reacts to its environment in a round-about way,
when some factor appears within the organism
and overcomes an opposition, that we can first
say that a contributory value is present. To
illustrate, suppose a living, motile cell to be
subject to a variety of stimuli. It swims about
in a pool of water, drawn hither and thither by
the influence of light, currents of water, tem-
perature, perhaps color. If you could reckon
all the stimuli and manipulate them, you could
turn the cell into any direction of locomotion
that you pleased. Now suppose there came a
time when the cell responded in an unusual way
to a stimulus. You know, however, by hypo-
thesis, all of the possible stimuli from without
the organism, and therefore can describe what
has happened only by saying that some new
factor has entered into the field and has neutral-
ized or overcome the opposition of the stimulus
which you projected. Here, I believe, we have
the earliest stage of life in which we may speak
of the presence of a value.

Now it is very easy to say that no situation
of this kind ever occurred. I think, however,
that it will be possible to show that something
like it must have occurred. Psychologists tell

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 41

us that primitive conscious activity is marked
by rudimentary elements of cognition, feeling,
and will. They are not able to agree which of
the three is the most primitive aspect, but some
declare that all of them must be considered
equally fundamental — the will-aspect, perhaps,
being associated with activity in general. To
have rudimentary aspects of cognition and feel-
ing, however, it is necessary that at least two
sensations be related internally, and that there
be a difference felt between them. Now I main-
tain that the situation in which this could have
come about would contain a relation of organ-
ism to environment in which an opposition was
somehow circumvented by the organism. " Feel-
ing the difference between two stimuli " would
involve an independent action on the part of the
organism. We know that life has developed so
that living beings have become centers of con-
scious activity. There must have been some
point of transition. We may be sure that, what-
ever the situation may have been in its entirety,
it included the phenomenon of an opposition of
the organism to an environmental stimulus which
failed to work in the accustomed way. I must
add, however, that no portion of this theory is

42 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

intended to conflict in any way with a strict
doctrine of determinism. It is not that the
organism acts in an undetermined fashion, but
that the determining factor is no longer in the
environment, but in the organism itself.

I may formulate the following conclusions as
to the expression of the appearance of the earli-
est stage of consciousness in terms of value:

(a) The appearance of the earliest stage of
consciousness is, from the standpoint of the
observer, of contributory value with respect to
the bringing about of the existence of value
from the standpoint of the organism itself.

(b) This is true because this earliest stage of
consciousness gives birth to the initial require-
ment of value from the standpoint of the organ-
ism, namely, that there be a center of activity
to serve as the basis of an interest that is di-
rected outward, (c) The significant biological
aspect is the presence of a situation where an
opposition of some stimulus to a living organism
is overcome by a factor that is the product of
a process within the organism.

Before I describe the origin of value from
the standpoint of the individual himself, it may
be well to keep the observer's point of view for

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 43

a moment, in order to determine what kind of
value must be ascribed to the later developments
of conscious activity from the standpoint of the
observer. It seems to me that there is an a priori
answer to this question. All values from the
standpoint of the observer are contributory.
This is true (a) because they are estimated,
judged values, and (b) because it would be
absurd to speak of a good that was felt by an
observer with respect to a process in nature.
One doesn't feel the good of a rainstorm. He
estimates its good with reference to the supply
of water in rivers and wells, or the effect of it
upon the crops. The immediate values of felt
coolness, the sparkle of light on the globules,
etc., have nothing to do with the process as
process.

The observer, therefore, in making a survey
of the development of conscious activity in the
individual from its lowest to its highest forms,
will recognize as values those developments
which tend toward the end of value from the
standpoint of the individual himself. Instinct,
intelligence, memory, ideation, sympathy, etc.,
all will be contributory, from the observer's
standpoint.

44 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Now it must be evident that the observer's
standpoint, although it is the necessary point of
view of the critic and the basis of all discussion
of every kind, is not very productive as a method
for the consideration of value. We need to take
the standpoint of the individual consciousness
itself, in order to arrive at the relations between
the two classes of value. Two ways of doing
this are open: (a) We may become intro-
spective and seek the relation of the goods that
we feel to the goods that we find useful. This
method was that which gave me the initial
distinction between immediate and contributory
values. (b) Although our discussion itself
must remain contributory in character, we can,
however, look at the development of conscious
activity from the standpoint of the individual
himself. We view the process as a whole, yes,
but we consider how one particular element of
the whole is related to the other elements of the
situation. The center from which we direct
our attention to surrounding factors is the cen-
ter of conscious activity that has come into
being with the appearance of a particular con-
sciousness. The relations between this center
of activity and its environment will be values
if they contain the element of interest.

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 45

The earliest stage of consciousness, as we
have seen, contains a difference felt} and from
the observer's standpoint the appearance of this
stage is of contributory value. Can we speak
of this earliest stage of consciousness in terms
of value from the standpoint of the organism?
Perhaps not at the very moment of appearance,
for the felt difference has no relation to a pre-
exist ent center of activity. But suppose the
difference to take unto itself a new object of
discrimination. Suppose that there is now pres-
ent, in the most elementary form of perception,
recognition of three differents which constitute
a little environment. Suppose, as we must, the
presence of rudimentary feeling. It seems to
me that, from this very earliest moment when
the individual merits the title of individual,
there is a situation which may be described in
terms of value from the individual's own stand-
point. There is a center of activity; the com-
parison between the elementary perceptions is
contributory toward future actions from that
center; they are, therefore, contributory values.

§ 5. What of the feeling-aspect? From the
observer's standpoint, these elements are of con-
tributory value. Feelings of pleasure and pain,

46 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

however primitive, would act as warnings or as
encouragement to the organism to desist from
or persist in certain activities, just as percep-
tion of " differents," the original end of feel-
ings, is to help the organism get on with his
environment. In this respect, the standpoints
of the individual himself and of the observer
are in agreement. But the fact that in con-
scious activity every cognitive element has its
accompanying feeling-tone or feeling-attitude
gives a different color to the standpoint of the
individual. The sensation which I get by touch-
ing a hot stove is accompanied by a feeling of
pain; but the idea of the stove which I retain is
accompanied by a feeling-attitude which is more
complex than the pain which I experienced, for
the reason that the idea of the stove is some-
thing more than hot-object. The various sen-
sations which serve as the basis of my idea of
the stove enter into a process of comparison
with the ideas of past sensations. The feeling-
attitude toward the idea of stove, therefore, is
not a feeling accompanying a " simple sensa-
tion," but one accompanying an idea that is
full of inferential import from past experience.
Stated in a proposition, this observation would

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 47

read: The feeling-attitude which accompanies
an idea is different from the feeling which
accompanies a simple sensation.

§ 6. How can this distinction best be ex-
pressed? Feelings are feelings, and the differ-
ence to which I refer can hardly be a psycho-
logical difference. I believe that it can best be
made in terms of value. We may say that the
feeling which accompanies a simple sensation is
of contributory value to the individual (from
the standpoints of both individual and observer),
but that the feeling toward the idea is of imme-
diate value. In other words, when the cognitive
process, by comparison and memory, develops
ideas, there arise accompanying feelings which
have exceeded the function of feelings which
accompany sensations. The latter were con-
tributory to the welfare of the individual; the
former comprise the feeling-side of the indi-
vidual's relation to his environment. From his
conscious activity as a center, cognitive and
feeling elements together are relating that cen-
ter to surrounding reality; his environment
grows like the concentric circles of ripples which
move outward from the place where a stone has
struck the water.

48 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

I have formulated this theory with reference
to a mature conscious activity. The method
of introspection facilitated the problem. Now,
however, we may apply the theory to early con-
scious activity which cannot be examined by
introspection. In this connection we shall find
it equally satisfying.

§ 7. The feeling element which is associated
with the cognitive element in the very earliest
appearance of consciousness is wholly contribu-
tory from the standpoints of both observer and
organism. The feeling elements that accom-
pany the various cognitive elements as they
arise, are likewise contributory, at the moment
of their origin. But the comparisons Eetween
cognitive elements that are recorded in a rudi-
mentary memory are accompanied by feelings
which, though contributory from the observer's
point of view, are the psychological basis of a
new kind of value, immediate in character. We
might, therefore, speak of contributory values
as the stuff out of which immediate values arise.

A corollary of this theory of immediate value
must not be neglected. It follows that, in the
case of a mature consciousness, one must dis-
tinguish between feelings that arise unaccom-

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 49

panied by reflection, and those which have been
influenced by the cognitive processes. For ex-
ample, I must distinguish between the feeling
of pain that comes to me when I touch a hot
stove in the dark and the dislike for that feel-
ing which almost instantaneously follows. The
former feeling is of contributory value to me in
prompting me to remove my hand; the latter
marks my attitude toward my experience, and
is an immediate value. It may be objected:
Did you not say, however, that my liking for
grapes must be distinguished from my thought
about that liking, the actual liking being imme-
diate, and the thought contributory ? Certainly,
and it must not be supposed that, by a feeling-
attitude which accompanies reflection, I mean
the reflection itself. The distinction here is
wholly within feeling. In the example of grapes,
my liking for grapes as an immediate value is
to be distinguished from the primitive feeling
accompanying the sensation that I receive when
I first put a grape into my mouth.

§ 8. It is not my purpose in this chapter to
go beyond a discussion of the interrelation of
values with respect to their origin. From the
consideration of their origin, however, it is

50 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

possible to point out two divergent directions in
the development of conscious activity. One of
these starts with the comparison of cognitive
elements in the primitive organism and develops
through memory, ideation, intelligence, intellec-
tion, judgment, etc., to knowledge, the highest
point of contributory value. The other direc-
tion of development is toward a growth of the
individual's environment by the accumulation of
feeling-attitudes which accompany the various
cognitive elements. These two functions in
conscious activity are never separated in any
action, but they are nevertheless always distinct
in character. And although feeling is never
present without cognition, it is not necessary
that a feeling-attitude which is recalled by the
recognition of an object be accompanied by the
same cognitive elements that were the original
cause of the attitude. My attitude of liking or
dislike toward a man may have followed in the
first instance a complicated process of judgment
in which I sized him up in various ways — his
disposition, the color of his hair, etc. When I
see the man again, the perception of him recalls
my attitude, which is the same as it was before,
although the elements which enter into my per-
ception have been vastly simplified.

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 51

I believe that the two branches of conscious
activity which I have described embody a more
fundamental distinction than that made by Berg-
son between instinct and intelligence. Bergson
distinguishes instinct and intelligence as being
two modes of life's action on the material world,
" directly, by creating an organised instrument
to work with; or else it [life] can effect it in-
directly through an organism which, instead of
possessing the required instrument naturally,
will itself construct it by fashioning inorganic
matter.,, 3 According to Bergson, intelligence
is characterized by its ability to make tools
out of artificial objects; it would therefore be
contributory. But instinct may also construct
tools,4 so that it must also be counted as con-
tributory. Later, however, Bergson 5 identifies
instinct with sympathy. It seems to me that
tool-constructing (even out of organic matter
only) and the feeling-attitude of sympathy are
too different ever to be united in one term. I
therefore believe that the distinction between
instinct and intelligence as expounded by Berg-
son cannot be fundamental.

3 Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution, trans. Mitchell, 142.

4 Op. cit., 140. s Op. cit., 176.

52 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

The results of the discussion contained in this
chapter may be summarized as follows:

§ i. Neither contributory nor immediate val-
ues require the presence of judgment for their
existence.

§ 2. There are two possible standpoints from
which values may be discussed, that of the ob-
server and that of the organism which values.

§ 3. From the observer's standpoint, the ap-
pearance of consciousness and all the elements
of consciousness are contributory in value, both
as to their origin and as to their persistence.

§ 4. The biological beginnings of value lie
in this: that some stimuli are dangerous for an
organism, and the organism overcomes them by
a process originating within itself.

§ 5. Feeling is contributory in origin, but
the feeling-attitudes which accompany ideas
rather than simple sensations are immediate,
from the standpoint of the individual.

§ 6. Cognition and feeling relate the indi-
vidual to his environment in ways that are never
isolated, but which always remain distinct in
character.

§ 7. Contributory values are the stuff out of
which immediate values arise.

WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 53

§ 8. The two divergent directions of the
development of conscious activity, which have
been described as leading to the experiencing of
contributory and immediate values respectively,
are more fundamentally distinct than Bergson's
division into instinct and intelligence.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES
WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE

THE subject-matter of this chapter falls
into two divisions. As in the discus-
sion of the origin of values, there are
here also two possible standpoints which may be
taken. As observer, I may look over the course
of evolution and observe judgment in the act
itself; I may view the circumstances which gave
rise to judgment; and I may view the content
of judgment in its relation to the development
of value in the individual. Or, from the stand-
point of the individual himself, I may ask what
values were first expressed in language by the
individual, how the conception of value came to
develop in the consciousness of the individual,
and to what limit the process of evaluation may
be carried.

It must be remembered, although it need not
lead to confusion, that the field of the second
division proposed for discussion is less inclusive
than the first. From the observer's standpoint,
I consider all types of judgment, not alone those
judgments which state values. Judgment is here

54

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 55

regarded in its aspect as the climax of develop-
ment of the cognitive function. Judgments in
general, therefore, will be contributory, accord-
ing to the rule that all the elements of conscious
activity, from the standpoint of the observer,
are contributory both as to their origin and
as to their persistence.1 From the individual's
standpoint, however, our attention is restricted
to those cases of judgment which bring to ex-
pression immediate or contributory values.

At one point, it must be said, the standpoints
of the observer and the individual may almost
merge. Such a phenomenon was not possible
in the case of the origin of values, because there
had not developed a process of conscious reflec-
tion. In the case of the judgment, however, it
is possible for the individual to look back on the
act of judgment and verify the result of the act.
So that, in discussing the content of the judg-
ment, it is immaterial whether we observers
anticipate the individual in his verification or
let him do it himself. In this case, therefore,
the distinction between the two standpoints,
while present, is immaterial to the discussion.
For convenience I have placed this section of

1 Page 43, §3.

56 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

the argument under the same heading as that
of the act of judgment, because judgments in
general are treated of in both sections.

I may, then, divide the discussion as follows:
I. Judgments as values (Standpoint of the
observer: A. Acts of judgment as values;
B. Content of judgments as values (Stand-
points merge). II. Judgments of values (Stand-
point of the individual).

I. JUDGMENTS AS VALUES
In discussing judgments as values, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between the act of judging
and the content of the judgment. An act of
judging is called forth in obedience to stimuli
in a particular set of circumstances. The pres-
ence or absence of value in the act itself must
be judged with reference to these particular
circumstances and not to any later usefulness
of the judgment. The value of any judgment,
however, may also be determined with reference
to its subsequent effect upon the activity of the
individual — whether it is found to be service-
able as a guide for future action. Value in this
instance is determined with respect to its con-
tent. Each of these cases will be discussed in
turn.

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 57

A. Acts of Judgment as Values
§ 1. The act of judgment has been contrasted
with the content of the judgment. This lan-
guage, though convenient, is inaccurate, for it
is evident that in considering the act of judg-
ment we are considering the judgment, and that
the judgment without content would not be a
judgment. What I mean, therefore, is rather
that here the act of judgment is discussed with
its content, but with reference only to the par-
ticular stimuli which call it forth. For example,
if I discuss the judgment " It is a fine day "
with reference to the act, I discuss its meaning
with regard to the circumstances which caused
me to make it, not with reference to the thunder-
storm which came up during the afternoon.
Just as the act of judgment can be approached
only from the standpoint of the observer, so is
the discussion of the content as caused only to
be carried out from that standpoint.

§ 2. Since from the standpoint of the ob-
server all values are contributory,2 the question
is not as to what kind of values acts of judg-
ment are, but whether acts of judgment are
values at all. The answer seems to follow di-

2 Page 43.

58 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

rectly from a point made in a preceding chap-
ter,3 that, from the standpoint of the observer,
values comprise whatever tends to the develop-
ment of value from the standpoint of the indi-
vidual himself. Under such a category are
included all the developments of the cognitive
function of conscious activity. For this reason
I maintain that all acts of judgment are con-
tributory.

(a) But there may be some doubt expressed
as to whether certain cases of acts of judgment
may be deemed contributory. What of acts of
existential judgment, false judgment, and theo-
retical (vs. " useful ") judgment? These dis-
tinctions are made from the standpoint of the
observer with reference to the content, however,
and, according to the rule just laid down, the
content must be considered here only with ref-
erence to the time of the act and the circum-
stances which caused the act. In such a light,
it will be seen that no matter what the content
may be, the act of judgment must, like every
other act, be a caused act. Furthermore, it is
a caused act within the cognitive field of con-
sciousness ; that is, the causal process takes place

3 Page 43.

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 59

within the organism itself. Therefore the act
of judgment, whatever be the content, always
adds to the functioning of conscious activity,
and, since whatever adds to the development
of interest around a center of activity directed
outward is contributory,4 all acts of judgment
are contributory.

B. Content of Judgments as Values
It was comparatively easy to maintain that
acts of judgment are contributory. One had
merely to view the evolutionary process and
see a series of caused actions directed outward
from a center of activity called consciousness.
Every element of this process is seen to be con-
tributory to its smooth working; every act is
the overcoming of obstacles that impede further
action.

When, however, we come to the consideration
of the content of the judgment with reference
to future action based on it, the case is more
difficult. It may appear that certain acts of
judgment, useful at the time of judging as steps
in the active process, are valuable only as acts,
later losing their value. Judgment is different

4 Pages 44-45.

60 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

from lower forms of cognition in that it may
be preserved in memory and expressed by an
artificial medium. (Of course, the terms of
judgment may also be remembered and ex-
pressed. " Ideation " would be more accurate
than "judgment," here.) The question of the
permanence of the content as value arises.
When is the content valuable as well as the
act? The test is the future usefulness of the
content.

The individual himself has now arrived at
the high plane of judgment.5 He may there-
fore discuss the matter himself, or we observers
may do it for him; the two standpoints will not
differ in their result.

I shall endeavor to substantiate the following
thesis :

The content of judgments is contributory
when the judgments are true, and may be con-
tributory when the judgments are false but
when the terms of the judgments are signs of
real entities.

The question of truth or falsity was imma-
terial when consideration of the judgment was
restricted to the act, and its content to the

5 Cf. page 55.

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 61

particular circumstances which called it forth.
But when the value of the judgment is consid-
ered with reference to future actions on the part
of the individual, the question of truth or falsity
becomes important. If I find, when I come to
verify a judgment, that I have been wrong, the
content of that judgment will not be as useful
to me as it would have been, had I been right
in my judging. " It will not rain " may serve
to overcome my hesitation as to whether I shall
take an umbrella, but, if it does rain, I shall not
keep dry.

(i) True Judgments Are Contributory as to
Content

§ 3. We have already ascertained that acts
of judgment are contributory. Truth, however,
is a term which does not apply to judgment in
the act. At what point, therefore, it may be
asked, does the term " truth " become appli-
cable ?

Of course the answer depends upon one's
theory of the judgment. I can only state my
position as a basis for discussion. I hold that
truth is the expression in the judgment of real
relations. A true judgment is one that ex-

62 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

presses a relation between real terms. It is
evident that two requirements must be fulfilled
if a judgment is to be true: the terms must be
signs of real entities, and the relation between
the terms must be a real relation.

§ 4. Now this criterion of truth is an ex-
tremely hard one. It may take a judgment a
long time to become verified; one may never be
quite certain about the truth of some particular
judgment. On the other hand, some judgments
require no verification at all. When I formu-
late a definition, I state the equality of two
signs, and no special proof or verification is
necessary, because the terms are signs invented
for the same entity. Such a definition would
be a mathematical definition of a circle, a line,
etc. It may easily happen, however, that the
explanatory term of the definition will require
some measure of verification. We speak of
" good definitions " and " poor definitions," ac-
cording as the explanatory term marks off accu-
rately a special portion of reality. Thus, if I
define a horse to be a four-legged animal or a
white quadruped, I shall not form a good defi-
nition, because the explanatory term will be
either too inclusive or too exclusive. No one

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 63

would deny the truth of the proposition " The
horse is a four-legged animal " ; but every one
would say that the proposition " The horse is a
white quadruped " is false. The former judg-
ment relates terms that are signs of real entities,
but the latter judgment relates terms between
which there is no equality as respects the por-
tions of reality for which they stand. One
judgment is true, the other false; and yet they
are both poor definitions.

There is apparently some confusion here.
" Poor definition " means one that is not valu-
able, or as valuable as it might be. But both
true and false definitions, as we see, may be
poor. It is obvious, then, that the criteria of
truth and value are not the same. The criterion
of truth has been mentioned. It is now neces-
sary to discuss the relation of truth to value,
and to do so, we must discover where the two
criteria differ.

§ 5. The thesis which I laid down was,
: True judgments are contributory.' ' This
proposition is the pragmatists' " Truth is use-
ful." It by no means follows that " All con-
tributory judgments are true" (the converse).
In order to make clear the distinction, it will be

64 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

necessary to discuss the end to which judgments
are contributory or useful.

Truth itself has no need of an end; it is
simply the expression in judgment of real rela-
tions. Some authors have attempted to infer
that truth is an end-in-itself, a given value.
This, however, is illicit. I may indeed make
truth an end, and it will thereby become a given
good, an immediate value; but, according to the
common realistic definition to which I adhere,
truth is something apart from the interest of
any individual. It does not arise from within
the organism; it is rather the effect in con-
sciousness of what is brute and obstinate in
reality. The individual consciousness is not
forced to become interested in any part of real-
ity except that with which it comes into contact.
It may find the truth ; it may not ; but it is forced
in any case to attach value to its environment.

Truth, therefore, represents the accurate re-
lation of portions of reality in the judgment,
while value represents the relation of portions
of reality to my interest. And what is the
nature of this interest? It is that of conscious
activity directed toward an end whose character
is disclosed in the evolutionary process itself:

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 65

conscious activity tends to describe and inter-
pret reality in terms of itself; the individual by
nature is ego-centric from his instinct of self-
preservation to his most altruistic impulses.
Note that ego-centric does not mean selfish; it
means rather that the individual of matured
conscious activity feels a sympathy toward,
feels drawn toward the whole universe, that
interest from the individual center of conscious
activity tends to direct itself outward as far as
possible. Such is the nature of the end to
which contributory values are useful.

§ 6. It will be apparent, therefore, that,
while truth in itself is no value at all, true
judgments, proceeding from an individual, will
always be contributory to putting him into touch
with the reality which opposes him and which
he must conquer by interpretation. But not
only does it not follow that all contributory
judgments are true, but it also does not follow
that all true judgments are of the greatest, or
of equal contributory value. There are degrees
of contributory value, but there are no degrees
of truth. One truth is just as true as another,
but it may be of much less contributory value.
The existential judgment, for instance, is true

66 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

and contributes to my taking stock of brute
reality, so to speak; but the judgment "Fire
exists " is not so contributory as " Fire burns "
— yet both are equally true.

(2) False Judgments May Be Contributory
When Their Terms Are Signs of Real
Entities

To prove this portion of my thesis, it will be
necessary to revert for a moment to discussion
of the act of judgment. I shall ask, " What
characterizes an act of judgment?"

§ 7. Acts of judgment were proved to be
contributory.6 My proof assumed that, in the
case of every act of judgment, there is always
present in consciousness a causal situation of
which the act is the result. We may accord-
ingly find cases of apparent judgment where
there are no acts of judgment, properly so-
called. A parrot may be taught to say, " This
is just as good!" but he will not perform an
act of judgment, because conscious interest is
lacking. The schoolboy may write on his slate
" The sun shines " a hundred times, and there
probably is only one act of judgment, made in

• Page 58.

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 67

connection with the first writing. A proposi-
tion, done in writing, and buried in the Sahara
desert, forgotten absolutely {pro argument 0)
by its author, and never again seen by man, is
not an act of judgment. In none of these cases
is a value present, because the conscious situa-
tion is lacking. To be contributory, judgment
must be associated with interest, and this inter-
est may be either from the standpoint of the
observer in the act itself, or in an act of re-cog-
nition on the part of the individual.

§ 8. It was easy to show that acts of false
judgment are contributory from the standpoint
of the observer, as well as acts of true judg-
ment. It is now questioned whether the con-
tent of the false judgment remains contributory
after the act, with reference to further action
on the part of the individual.

From the preceding discussion it is apparent
that our consideration assumes that the false
judgment is related to future action on the part
of the individual — otherwise the element of
interest would disappear. Providing that its
terms have reference to portions of reality, the
situation of the false judgment is that the indi-
vidual has stated a relation between signs of

68 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

real entities which does not hold in reality. Now
the end to which judgments are contributory, as
we have found, is the relation of reality to a
center of conscious activity. By the false judg-
ment, the individual has related portions of real-
ity in terms of consciousness, but he has related
them falsely.

Ideation is contributory, along with the other
developments of the cognitive function. There-
fore, the terms of the false judgment are con-
tributory, because they relate portions of reality
to a center of conscious activity. It is asked
whether the incorrect relation of these terms
may ever be contributory.

My answer is, " Yes ! " The individual thinks,
believes that the false judgment is true (falsity
is, therefore, from the standpoint of the observer,
here also). He acts on this judgment as if it
were true. Later he may discover that it was
false ; he may never discover its falsity. Which-
ever happens, the false judgment will serve, in
all probability, as a basis of future action. We
make mistakes in our judgment, but learn by
experience. It would be very satisfying if we
always judged correctly, but it would be ghastly
if we never judged except when we were sure

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 69

that we were judging truly. To behave in such
an impossible manner would necessitate our ac-
cepting the judgments of one in whom we had
as great faith as we have in our perceptions.
Independent judgment would be denied to us.
We could never make our own verifications.
If we never made mistakes, we never should
have certainty of anything.

§ 9. It is conceivable, however, that a false
judgment may sometimes have the opposite
effect of blocking future activity along the par-
ticular lines of its terms. An example of such
a judgment would be an obstinate prejudice.
An obstinate prejudice implies a refusal by act
of will to proceed in verification. Such a preju-
dice could not be called contributory (unless we
were to speak of it as a negative value, con-
tributory to the end of imbecility). Mistakes,
therefore, no more than true judgments, are
ends in themselves; but both are, or may be,
contributory to the biological end of value.

(3) Measurement of the Degree to Which a
Judgment is Contributory
§ 10. It was stated in § 6 7 that, although
there are no degrees of truth, there are degrees

7 Page 65.

70 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

of value. In the present connection, it will be
interesting to inquire whether there is some way
of measuring the degree to which a judgment
is contributory. This investigation, needless to
say, is quite independent of that as to what de-
grees of value the individual himself fixes in
judgment. The latter investigation belongs to
the section treating of judgments of values.
The present question is most conveniently
thought of as from the standpoint of the ob-
server, although there would be nothing to pre-
vent the individual himself from answering it.
Indeed, if he wishes to coordinate his aims in
life, he will think very seriously of this matter,
and try to make his judgments of values har-
monize with the degree to which his judgments
are values. That is, he will try not to attribute
greater or less value to anything in judgment,
than the judgment actually is worth, when con-
sidered with reference to the whole career of
the cognitive function. But, as I have before
remarked, attributing value in judgments is only
a small part of judging in general; and consid-
eration of the degree to which judgments are
valuable is a larger and more inclusive subject
than that of the degree to which value- judg-
ments are valuable.

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 71

A common-sense answer to our question would
be that the degree to which a contributory judg-
ment is contributory is the extent to which it
possesses " practicality/ ' But, as " practical-
ity " is a general term including a number of
elements, it will be worth while to analyze it.

There appear to me to be at least three con-
siderations involved in practicality, (a) To
be contributory, a judgment must be concerned
with reality, both in its terms and usually in the
relation expressed between the terms. Near-
ness, or readiness of reference, to " brute "
reality is a prominent feature here. If a term
is too far away from the portion of reality of
which it is a sign, it may easily have lost sharp-
ness of distinction; its flavor may be gone. This
is the reason why abstruse subjects are often
best discussed with the use of words that are
metaphorical, but very near to familiar objects.
The effectiveness and permanent application of
teaching by allegory is thus explained. If very
theoretical terms are employed, their value will
often be proportionate to the readiness with
which they may be referred back to portions of
reality. Thus, a formula of mechanics may be
highly technical, but may be extremely valuable
6

72 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

because of the ease with which it may be applied
to reality, (b) Another factor which enters
into the degree to which judgments of con-
tributory values are contributory is their rela-
tion to the special environment of the individual.
A judgment may be very useful to a physician,
but comparatively useless to an artisan. The
biological end to which judgments are contribu-
tory is the same for all men, but the field of
judgment is so immense that different indi-
viduals must work from different centers in
the field, and no man can hope to attain all
knowledge. Thus the practicality of a judg-
ment will also be measured with reference to
its possible application to the individual's line
of activity, (c) What applies to the single
individual here applies also to the human race.
Humanity has an environment distinct from
that of insects or birds, and the degrees of
contributory value may well be distinguished by
considering the degrees to which needs are
common to mankind. It must not be inferred,
however, that we have knowledge of any judg-
ments that do not affect human environment.
Such a possibility is excluded by the result of
our study of the origin of value in conscious-

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 73

ness. I mean merely that certain judgments
will be found to be more, or less, contributory
to mankind, according as they overcome the
oppositions common to the race rather than to
a special class of men.

§ 11. Finally, it may be objected that it is
possible, by manipulation of terms, to arrive at
judgments which have no contributory function
at all. I may speak of these as theoretical judg-
ments. This class of judgments will not include
those judgments which may be referred by a
round-about way to reality, or to those which
might have a possible application at some future
time, but only to those which, for the sake of
argument, are purely speculative and unreal.
If there are any such judgments, their existence
is still not a good argument against my theory
of values. For, together with my general ac-
ceptance of realism, I hold that judgments are
additive to reality; i.e., they are portions of
reality itself, insofar as they are preserved in
memory. The extent to which such judgments
are contributory will be the degree to which the
individual is interested in the imaginary terms.

Division I of this chapter may be summarized
as follows:

74 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

I. Judgments as Values (Standpoint of the
Observer).

A. Acts of Judgment as Values.

§ i. More accurately, the act of judgment is
here discussed with its content, but only with
reference to the particular stimuli which call it
forth.

§ 2. Acts of judgment are a development of
the cognitive function of consciousness. All
such developments are contributory values.
Therefore, acts of judgment are contributory
values.

(a) Whatever be the character of the con-
tent, an act of judgment is a caused act in the
sphere of conscious activity; hence it is of con-
tributory value.

B. Content of Judgments as Values.

This topic deals with the future usefulness
of the content.

(i) True judgments are contributory as to
content.

§ 3. For a judgment to be true, its terms
must be signs of real entities, and the relation
between the terms must be a real relation.

§ 4. This criterion of truth is not the cri-

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 75

terion of value, as is shown by the illustration
that a true and a false definition may be equally
" poor."

§ 5. Truth has no end; value has a bio-
logical end.

§ 6. True judgments, however, are values
because they contribute to the biological end of
value.

(2) False judgments may be contributory
when their terms are signs of real entities.

§ 7. To be valuable, a judgment must involve
interest.

§ 8. The terms of false judgments, when
they are signs of real entities, are contributory.
The false relation is contributory if the indi-
vidual uses it as the basis of future action;
i.e., if it retains the individual's interest.

§ 9. Some false judgments may stifle inter-
est in both terms and relation. These might be
considered to be of negative value.

(3) Measurement of the degree to which a
judgment is contributory.

§ 10. The degree to which the content of a
judgment is contributory is the degree of its
nearness or readiness of reference to reality,

76 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

its nearness to the special environment of the
judging individual, and its universality of ap-
plication to mankind.

§ ii. The content of purely theoretical or
imaginary judgments is contributory in propor-
tion to the interest of the individual in the theo-
retical terms.

II. JUDGMENTS OF VALUES

We now come to the discussion of judgments
of values by the individual. Let us gain a clear
conception of the subject-matter of this division.
It is quite obvious that an individual may make
judgments without expressing values from his
own standpoint. He cannot make a judgment,
of course, without expressing a value consid-
ered from the observers standpoint.8 But he
may make judgments that involve interest to
him personally, and yet not think of his interest.
The judgments by which a man expresses his
needs and his wants, and declares what is con-
tributory to the satisfaction of those needs and
wants, form but a small proportion of his daily
speech and thoughts. The confusion that is
rife in this branch of the subject is largely due

8 §§2-9.

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 77

to the habit of some of mingling the standpoints
of the observer and the individual. It is also
due to the practice of certain writers of con-
sidering truth as a " value-judgment." Having
refuted this theory in a preceding chapter,9 we
shall do well to keep in mind the fact that, in
the present case, we are dealing with only a
very limited class of judgments.

Our present investigation is parallel, in a way,
with that of the origin of contributory and im-
mediate values. There 10 a situation was sought
where immediate and contributory values first
emerged in consciousness. Here we seek a sit-
uation where values first become expressed in
the judgment, where the individual first ex-
presses his own interest. The former investi-
gation was entirely from the standpoint of the
observer; the latter will be from that of the
individual himself.

In the discussion of the interrelation of values
with respect to their origin, the data considered
were biological. In the present investigation
one might consider facts connected with the
development of speech observed in savage tribes

9 Chapter II.
i° Chapter III.

78 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

(phylogenetic), or, as is more convenient, facts
may be adduced with reference to the devel-
opment of speech in the child (ontogenetic).
Introspection may aid in confirming results ob-
tained by the other methods.

The reason why we are concerned with the
origin of immediate and contributory judgments
rather than with their interrelation in an indi-
vidual of mature growth, is that we recognize,
at the start, that a mature individual uses two
separate and distinct kinds of judgments of
value, immediate and contributory. It is upon
this hypothesis that the whole discussion rests.

The investigation may be divided conveniently
into two parts:

A. Origin of immediate judgments; B. Ori-
gin of contributory judgments.

A. Origin of Immediate Judgments
§ 12. The first words that a child uses are
names of objects. He is taught words that
symbolize certain perceptions. There is no ques-
tion of expressing value here. The early stages
of speech are just as mechanical as the act of
perception itself. The fixation of meaning to
certain verbal sounds does not imply that the

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 79

child has the ability to reflect upon that mean-
ing. He names the objects that attract his
attention.

A young child has wants and needs. His
attention is attracted to the objects that satisfy
these wants. Some of his wants are necessary
to his life — mother, water. But he may reach
out his hands to grasp the moon, and cry,
"Moon!" if he were taught the word that
symbolizes that object. Many of the words
that he first learns are words that symbolize
objects that he wants and needs. Some of them
merely satisfy the need of locating himself in
his immediate environment. But in no case is
there any question of his expressing a value.

Identification of objects with symbols of ex-
pression, therefore, is not fixing values upon
objects, however valuable those objects may be
to him from the standpoint of an observer. But
the child comes to learn other words. Some of
these may express feelings of desire, as " want,"
" like." He learns to combine these words with
certain objects: " Love mother "; " Want milk."
The case as regards value differs here. The
child is now expressing a feeling-attitude in a
simple form of judgment. He is expressing an

80 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

immediate value in words. He recognizes his
personal interest.

Our conclusion, therefore, with respect to the
origin of judgments of immediate value may be
expressed in the following proposition:

The individual recognizes his interest when a
situation occurs in which he identifies a feeling-
attitude with words.

B. Origin of Contributory Judgments
§ 13. I have illustrated the way in which a
judgment of immediate value may be expressed
very simply. The case is not so simple with
lespect to contributory values. The child has a
need; let us say he is thirsty. He may have the
need and be unable to connect his need with
speech ; he may only cry or make foolish sounds.
He may know the substance water by name, and
call out " Water ! " He may express not only
the object of his desire, but the desire itself,
and say, "Want water." ' (Here we have the
expression of an immediate value in the judg-
ment.) In the last named case, he connects the
object of desire with the desire itself, but he
does not express in the judgment the way in
which the object will satisfy the desire. We

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 81

infer that when he gets the water his desire
will disappear; but he does not express the fact
that the water is for the purpose of satisfying
the desire, that the water will be the means of
attaining the end of his wish.

In the judgment "Want water!" there is
something lacking to make it express the fact
that water is of contributory value. The need
and the object of the need are expressed, but
not the purpose of the need. To have the latter,
there must be added some word or words that
will symbolize the object in the process of satis-
fying the need. Such symbolism is afforded by
expressions of purpose, the simplest of which is
the infinitive (with to or in ing). " Want water
to drink " or " Want water for drinking " ex-
presses in a simple way (a) the desire, (b) the
object of desire, and (c) the fact that the object
is the principal means of satisfying the desire.
The third is attained by the use of a word that
shows the desire in process of fulfilment by the
use of the object. Here is the first case where
a contributory value finds expression.

Reflection will show us that contributory val-
ues are always accompanied in their expression
by some statement of their end. They are con-

82 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

tributory to something, not simply given as good.
The satisfaction of thirst is an immediate value,
given as good. I may connect that value with
the object water, however, without thinking
specifically of water as " good for " satisfying
my thirst. The latter process is the outcome
of reasoning about my desire. It contains the
reflection that the object that I already want is
wanted for a purpose which I now make clear
to myself. Thus introspection confirms my
previous illustration.

It may therefore be stated as a proposition,
that the individual gives expression to a con-
tributory value first when he uses words that
show how an object of desire satisfies the end
of desire.

§ 14. I have described the simplest situa-
tions in which the individual expresses an im-
mediate and a contributory value. There is a
further stage of expression of contributory
value. This comes to view when the individual
goes beyond his own desires in expressing values
by judgment. He sees that others beside him-
self have desires and that they may be satisfied
by certain means. Certain desires he finds to
be common to his kind. Contributory value

WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 83

may then be expressed by a general proposition,
" Water is good to drink." He may extend
the application of value still farther. He may
apply it to objects which further the processes
of nature, and may say, for example, " The soil
is good for nourishing the plant." This is one
way in which contributory values may become
more and more objective, i.e., divorced from the
individual who makes the evaluation. So that
in expressing values by the judgment, we may
state that contributory values arise in intimate
association with immediate values, but that, as
the power of expression develops, they may be-
come entirely free from immediate values.

This division of the chapter may be sum-
marized as follows:

A. Origin of Immediate Judgments.

§ 12. The individual first expresses an im-
mediate value when a situation occurs in which
he symbolizes a feeling-attitude by a form of
words.

B. Origin of Contributory Judgments.

§ 13. He first expresses a contributory value
when he uses words that show how an object
of desire satisfies the end of desire.

84 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

§ 14. Contributory values in their expres-
sion in the judgment arise in intimate associa-
tion with immediate values, but, as the power
of expression develops, they become free from
the immediate, so that the individual of mature
growth may express in the judgment two dis-
tinct classes of values, immediate and contribu-
tory.

CHAPTER V

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES
WITH RESPECT TO THEIR CO-EX-
ISTENCE

IN Chapter I, two classes of values were
defined and distinguished. They were dis-
covered by introspection, but it was found
that there is a psychological basis for the dis-
tinction. Immediate values are grounded in
the feeling-aspect of consciousness; contribu-
tory, in the cognitive. The brief treatment of
Chapter I, however, is inadequate to the im-
portance of the distinction. In this chapter, I
purpose more fully to discuss value-relations of
the individual to his environment. To do this
successfully, it will be necessary first to inquire
just what is meant, in this connection, by the
term " environment."

The chapter may therefore be divided into
two main topics:

I. Environment; II. Environment and Values.

I. ENVIRONMENT
§ i. The word "environment" is not re-
stricted in common usage to the surroundings

85

86 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

of a living being. We speak of the " environs "
of a city, using an almost identical word. It
would be perfectly possible to speak of the en-
vironment of a chair or a building. But most
commonly it is used of the surroundings of a
plant or animal; that is, an organism is con-
trasted with surrounding organisms or objects.
As our sphere of discussion is limited to the
animal kingdom, we may at the outset limit its
usage to the contrast between an animal organ-
ism and its surroundings.

§ 2. How much of an organism's surround-
ings does " environment " include ? In an ex-
tended sense of the word, we might say that
there is no part of the world of matter and
motion that does not belong to the environment
of an organism. The influence of physical laws
is so far-reaching that very remote physical
disturbances may influence an organism quite
apart from his knowledge. The conditions of
environment may be altered by sun-spots, by
an earthquake thousands of miles distant, or by
the temperature of currents of water that wash
the coast nearest an inland region. Man's en-
vironment, in a sense, is the world.

We see, therefore, that environment may be

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 87

considered to include a great deal. This most
inclusive use of the word, however, cannot be
useful to us in a discussion of value; for, by-
adopting it, we shall only find a synonym for
" the world." It is desirable for us to restrict
it in its application. Now there is a time-differ-
ence between the stimuli that affect an organism
from its environment. The sun is ultimately
responsible for my perception of light, but the
immediate cause is certain light-waves that
strike the retina of the eye. There is a point
at which the sensitive protoplasm of an organ-
ism comes into contact with the world beyond
itself; there are immediate stimuli that may
be contrasted with those more remote in time
and space. It is to these immediate stimuli
that I shall refer when I speak of the action
of environment with reference to an organism.
Environment will designate that part of the
world which directly influences it, that part
with which the organism comes into contact.

§ 3. In reference to a very primitive organ-
ism, this conception of environment is perfectly
clear. No explanation was necessary when the
word was thus used in Chapter III. There the
contrast between organism and environment was

88 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

biological, rather than psychological. It was
clear what was meant by saying that the bio-
logical indication of the presence of value from
the standpoint of the organism was the presence
of a situation in which the organism responded
to dangerous stimuli from the environment by
a process originating within itself. The earlier
stages of conscious activity were taken in their
biological significance, and they were described
with reference to the acts themselves.

In the case of a mature individual, however,
there is a complication. Here conscious activity
has reached a highly developed form. Is it
useful for us still to maintain the biological
standpoint? When I speak of "my environ-
ment," am I using the phrase in the biological
or the psychological sense? The answer that I
give to these questions will depend largely upon
my philosophical pre-disposition. The problem
of the relation between mind and body comes to
the fore. And I am in danger of entering into
an epistemological tangle. Let us examine a
few of the ways that various philosophers may
regard " environment/'

(a) The materialist, or the instrumental
pragmatist, preserves the biological standpoint

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 89

intact. To him conscious activity is a function
of certain cells of the body, and " conscious-
ness " is as much a part of him as his hands
or his feet. The relation of man to his environ-
ment is the relation of man considered as body
plus conscious activity.

(b) Those who make a difference between
mental and non-mental, whether they be inter-
actionists or psycho-physical parallelists, may
think of environment as the relation of con-
sciousness to its objects. Environment may
mean " mental environment " or " physical en-
vironment. " It may have to do with the rela-
tion of mind to its objects (psychological) or
the relation of the physical organism to sur-
rounding objects (biological) or the relation of
consciousness to objects in the world (psycho-
physical).

(c) Spiritualists (i.e., subjective and objec-
tive idealists and the like) would find the con-
trast one between one and another kind of
mental entities. But the nature of the contrast
between organism and environment would vary
with the degree of " objectivity " attributed to
the physical world.

§ 4. Now beside being intellectually dishon-

90 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

est, it would invalidate my reasoning if I should
use the contrast between organism and environ-
ment first in one sense, then in another. The
question of philosophical pre-disposition, on the
other hand, is not nearly so important as that
I find a meaning of the contrast that will be
most useful in the development of my theory
of value.

The " process originating within itself," which
was seen to be the biological concomitant of the
origin of value from the individual's standpoint,
is likely to be agreed to be a very rudimentary
form of conscious activity. In this case, there-
fore, conscious activity was described wholly
from the biological point of view. This stand-
point was found to be entirely adequate to the
discussion of my theory of value. Why not,
then, keep to the biological standpoint in my
discussion of the values of a mature individual?
It will be seen that, in man, mature conscious
activity can still be described in terms of the
standpoint of the organism without trespassing
beyond the biological aspect.

§ 5. This point of view is nearest like that
of the instrumental pragmatists, as developed
in Creative Intelligence.1 It must not be in-

1 New York, 1917.

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 91

ferred, however, that I count myself one of
their followers. In this connection there are
two especial points of difference between us.

(a) I must refuse to commit myself to a
decision as to whether existent " reality " is a
certain or an uncertain quantity. By " reality "
I mean the physical world. If, however, the
term be taken to include all that happens, I
should agree that it is quantitatively uncertain.

(b) As a logical consequence of their stand-
point, the instrumental pragmatists get rid of
" sensations " in the classical use of that term.
Organisms differ, according to them, chiefly by
the " emotional tone " of the relation of " or-
ganic complexes " to other things.2 While I
also emphasize the importance of feeling-atti-
tudes in my theory of value, I am not prepared
to say that the cognitive aspect of conscious
activity is not of as great importance to value
as the feeling-aspect. That is, I recognize that
the standpoint of the individual, formed by the
" orientation " of complex relations about a
center, may be described with respect to the
value of these relations apart from the aspect
of their " emotional tone." Nevertheless, it

2 Cf. Kallen, in Creative Intelligence, 415-416.

92 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

must be remembered that the individual ac-
quired a standpoint of his own only when his
first feeling-attitude appeared. But once the
individual has attained a standpoint of his
own, what were formerly relations without any
" emotional tone " now become relations of in-
terest to the individual in the cognitive aspect,
without reference to the acquired " emotional
tone."

§ 6. In § 2, environment was defined for
our purpose as those things which act directly
upon the organism as stimuli, that with which
the organism is in direct contact. As this use
of the word was adopted for our convenience,
we must be careful not to let it become a source
of annoyance. It would be such if we conceived
it with scientific accuracy. For one might ask,
If my conscious activity is in contact with that
chair by means of light-waves which strike the
retina of my eye, are the waves at the very point
where they meet the retina, my environment?
This would be to make a practical working defi-
nition worthless by over-refining it. Practically,
we shall conceive environment to extend as far
as our perception will carry us. It will include
sensational experience, and also that amount of

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 93

inferential experience which is a part of our
perception. But it will not include knowledge
about an object which is buried in memory at
the time of my perception. Thus, although I
know that the wood of my chair came from a
forest, and that some man cut the tree down
and sawed it, planed, hammered, and polished
it, the tree in the forest, the woodcutter, the
saw-mill, the carpenter, the turner, and the
polisher will not be included in my environment
so far as my perception of the chair is con-
cerned. If, however, the thought of these sug-
gested itself to me as I looked at the chair, they
would be included in my environment, and their
importance in it would be determined by the
extent to which I am familiar with them in
actual experience. They would be much more
important if, for instance, I had seen the very
tree cut down and the whole process of manu-
facture of the chair, than if I had only read
about how chairs are made.

The point that lies behind this argument is
that conscious activity, conceived as one of the
functions of an organism, is related to surround-
ing objects in varying degree, just as other
functions of the organism are related to sur-

94 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

rounding matter. The peculiar nature of con-
scious activity lies in the fact that " contact
with " is broader and freer here than in the
case, for example, of a muscle or a hair. The
importance of this difference for us is that
value-relations have to do with that portion of
environment with which conscious activity is in
contact.

§ 7. Now conscious activity, after it has
emerged from what I called in Chapter III the
" earliest stage of consciousness," is in contact
with environment under two aspects, cognition
and feeling. I wish that this statement might
be accepted without further discussion, but I
fear that it will be necessary to digress a little
and treat briefly of certain disputes among psy-
chologists.

It is the fashion among psychologists to an-
alyze their states of consciousness to find out
what aspects are present, and which may exist
apart from other aspects. For example, Titch-
ener asks, " Do we ever attend without feel-
ing? " 3 He answers, Yes, and points to reflex,
automatic, and ideo-motor actions, " performed
without the arousal of pleasantness-unpleasant-

3 Titchener, E. B., Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of
Feeling and Attention, 296-302.

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 95

ness in consciousness." May we, on the other
hand, feel without attending? Wundt says that
we may. Titchener says not. The latter adds,
" I incline rather to find a fairly close parallel
between degree of clearness [his criterion of
attention] and degree of pleasantness-unpleas-
antness, and thus to regard the relation between
affection and attention, on this side, not as ex-
ternal, but as intrinsic."

Another dispute relates to the number and
nature of affective qualities. Wundt's tri-dimen-
sional theory of feeling postulates pleasantness-
unpleasantness, excitement-tranquilisation, and
tension-relaxation as the three " dimensions of
affection." Thereupon psychologists introspect
their feelings. Some, as Titchener, find only
one dimension. The tri-dimensionalists speak
slightingly of the "Dogma der Lust-Unlust-
theorie"

My criticism of such disputes, of which there
are many, is twofold. The psychologists who
indulge in them are (a) biased by a predis-
position to hold the theory of psycho-physical
parallelism. Consequently, conscious activity is
not conceived by them in the act itself, but
epiphenomenally. The stimuli from environ-

96 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

ment are conceived as affecting the physical
part of the organism, while it becomes of inter-
est to inquire what happens at the same time
in consciousness. Much opportunity is thereby
afforded for introspective observation, but very
little hope that correct conclusions may be
reached. Consciousness is conceived as follow-
ing alongside physical processes. It is assumed
that these processes may throw off effects in
consciousness, may partly do so, or may go
along blissfully by themselves.

Again (b)y the nature of these disputes im-
plies that consciousness may be divided into
" faculties." When it is asked whether atten-
tion may exist without feeling, the unit of con-
scious activity is set aside. Cognition, feeling,
and attention lose their character as aspects.
The mere putting of such a question almost
assumes that attention and feeling are separate
parts of consciousness which often appear to-
gether, but which might well be conceived some-
times to be separated, only one appearing. At-
tention, throughout, seems to be regarded as
cognitive attention. At least, psychologists in-
trospect to discover whether they are attending,
and the introspective process is certainly cog-

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 97

nitive. They also introspect to discover whether
they are feeling pleasantness or unpleasantness,
and assume that, if they could not discover such
a feeling, the feeling aspect would not be pres-
ent. What about the pleasant feeling of strok-
ing that a cat sometimes experiences? Is this
dependent upon her knowing that she has it?

§ 8. Against such a point of view let me
place a theory recommended by its simplicity
and its ability to fit in with facts of observation.

Conscious activity is always one in its func-
tioning. There are certain distinct aspects of
conscious activity, however, and sometimes one
of these is more prominent than another. Such
is generally the case. It would be difficult to
conceive of a situation in which attention, pleas-
antness or unpleasantness, and cognition were
present in the same degree.. Some form of con-
templation would approach nearest to this con-
dition, but contemplatives actually advise their
disciples to keep attention away from feeling as
far as possible.

But where conscious activity is just emerging
from non-conscious, there are not such pro-
nounced aspects. Here there is a sensitive con-
dition which doubtless exhibits the rudiments of

98 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

cognition, feeling, and will; but none of these
appears in a prominent way. It is curious how
willing some psychologists (except those who
are " gefuhlsempfindungen" theorists) are to
admit that feeling is of " elemental rank in con-
sciousness " 4 but yet discuss the question of
whether it need be present with other elements.
I think that this is due to the epiphenomenalistic
attitude of such writers.

In later stages of development, one aspect of
conscious activity is more prominent than others.
The mistake of many psychologists is their cheer-
ful assumption that, with the prominence of one
aspect over others, the others disappear. But
conscious activity is in contact with environment
as a whole, not in a divided state. There is no
warrant whatever for the supposition that, in
a mature conscious individual, aspects of con-
scious activity are transitory, flitting on and off
the stage of consciousness. This view reeks of
epiphenomenalism. The only support for such
a theory is derived from introspection, which
cannot be depended upon in this connection, as
it is a cognitive process.

§ 9. For my present purpose, the importance

4Titchener, op. cit., 289.

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 99

of my theory lies in the fact that, if it be a true
description of what takes place, the feeling-
attitude, or the " affective side " of conscious
activity, must be regarded as present, even when
it is not exhibited by feelings of pleasantness-
unpleasantness. The latter feelings may better
be regarded as cases where the feeling side is
uppermost in conscious activity, not where feel-
ing is absent.

The obvious consequence of my theory is that
conscious activity is related to environment as
directly through feeling as through cognition.
Logical knowledge may well be the best instru-
ment for dealing with reality. It might be main-
tained (though this is open to question) that
cognition is the sole means by which we increase
the extent of our contact with reality. But these
admissions will in no way prove that " contact
with " is limited to the cognitive aspect of con-
sciousness; they will not remove the possibility
that our " contact with " contains elements of
feeling which have never resulted from cog-
nition. Furthermore, the fact that we increase
our contact with reality through cognition does
not prove that the feelings which are aroused
by the directive influence of cognition are de-

ioo VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

pendent in their whole meaning upon the cog-
nitive processes. They may have an independ-
ent relation to reality apart from cognition.

This doctrine may sound strange, and yet it
fits in well with the facts of experience. It tells
me that the portion of reality with which I am
in contact is not restricted to what I am con-
scious of through sensations and ideas, but that
it also includes that portion with which I am in
contact through the feeling-element of conscious-
ness. This is neither to say, with Rickert, that
knowledge is determined through the feelings,
nor with the older psychologists, that feeling is
dependent upon sensation. I mean rather that
the portion of reality with which I am in contact
is richer and fuller in my experience of it than
the knowledge of it which I obtain through the
senses ; and that, in denning " contact with "
environment, I must include a certain relation
to reality directly by feeling, and not indirectly
through sensation. In the higher stages of con-
scious activity, the presence of sensation may
be the only path to the broadening of environ-
ment; our experience of environment is always
partly sensational; but in itself environment is
more than relation to reality through sensation.

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 101

Of course this has nothing whatever to do with
the theory that we can obtain knowledge di-
rectly through feeling, or the theory that we
can increase our " contact with " environment
by plunging into states of feeling where cog-
nition is at a minimum.

I may give a few examples to illustrate direct
contact with the environment through the feeling
side of consciousness, where the latter predomi-
nates over the cognitive aspect. Such examples
can be drawn only from observation of the rela-
tion of others to their environment, and from
self-analysis based on knowledge gained after
the experience that is instanced. Both of these
methods of illustration apply in the following
case : We notice in the experience of others and
recall in our own past experience that we often
conceive a sudden dislike for a person at first
meeting. Later on, when we know him better,
we discover why we dislike him. Traits are
exhibited by him, opinions expressed, that are
foreign to our point of view. Cognition has
here confirmed the impression made upon us
that resulted in a feeling-attitude. Women in
general are reputed to be more " intuitive " in
this way than men. Again, I am forced very

102 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

often to act when I am ignorant of some of
the circumstances which should determine my
action. On such occasions I either guess at
the best course of action, or rely on a " feeling
for " one course. To say that such a " feeling "
is determined wholly by the general texture of
my ideas and feelings, rather than by some kind
of contact with the situation in hand, is to be
dogmatic, and to beg the question.

I may add that my theory, if true, would
prove to be of the greatest service to religious
apologists. Feeling and emotion have been em-
phasized by most religions, so much so, in fact,
that Arnold defined religion as " morality tinged
with emotion." Now if the emotion associated
with a religious experience (and let it be remem-
bered that I believe feeling to be wholly psycho-
logical and " subjective ") has no point of con-
tact with reality, if, that is, religious emotion is
subordinate and a by-product of consciousness,
it cannot be of much greater importance to
religious experience than as a stimulus to action.
The Christian faith, however, makes much of
love between God and man. It claims that God
bestows love upon his creatures and that man
can return this love. From the Christian point

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 103

of view, therefore, emotion is a way of being in
contact with environment. I do not say coming
into contact with a spiritual world, although
mystics and quietists make much of it as a
method. In point of fact, Christian teachers
of ascetic theology warn their pupils not to try
to obtain " spiritual sweetness," as they call it.
They even claim that " spiritual dryness " is a
stage of progress in advance of the spiritual
sweetness that is likely to attend the first efforts
for spiritual progress.

The same argument that is advanced with
respect to contact with personalities on earth
and with God, may also be applied to prayer
and to communion with saints and angels. It
proves nothing, of course. It only shows a
possible means of intercourse, provided that
spiritual beings form a portion of reality. It
shows, too, how a worshipper need not be bound
to his own conceptions of the spiritual world in
order to worship effectively (that is, again, pro-
vided Christian beliefs are grounded in reality).
The peasant woman of limited intelligence, who
gradually comes to identify the Virgin with the
grotesque statue in front of which she is pray-
ing, may not pray ineffectively. The experience

104 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

is always richer than the sensations and ideas
that are derived from it.

II. ENVIRONMENT AND VALUES
Having built a foundation by discussion of
the meaning of environment and of the relation
of an organism to its environment, we may pro-
ceed to the erection of a theory of co-existent
values. I think that it will scarcely be disputed
that whatever is of interest to conscious activity
is valuable from the standpoint of that conscious
activity. At the emergence of consciousness,
the individual acquired a standpoint of his own.
Conscious activity, starting in a rudimentary
way, develops and increases the scope of its
function. In the process of development, it
widens in its contact with environment. Its
relations to environment are value relations.

§ 10. Everything with which conscious ac-
tivity comes into contact is valuable both as
contributory and as immediate. Inasmuch as
cognition and feeling are aspects of the same
consciousness, objects of the environment will
be related to conscious activity both as cognitive
and affective. From the cognitive point of
view, these relations are relations of contribu-

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 105

tory value. The objects related are " good
for " some purpose. They are guide-posts to
conscious activity in its contact with environ-
ment. They help it find its way in and among
other objects with which it is not in contact.
They are the interests of consciousness from
one point of view.

But conscious activity is also related to the
objects with which it is in contact from the feel-
ing side. These relations are relations of imme-
diate values. It is not necessary that pleasant-
ness-unpleasantness be recognized to make ob-
jects of immediate value. All that is necessary
is that there be a feeling-tone of conscious activ-
ity, and this affective aspect is present in all but
the earliest stage of consciousness. The nestful
of tggsy the " never-to-be-too-much-set-upon
object" of the hen (James), does not demand
the presence of recognition of pleasantness on
the part of the hen to make it of immediate
value to her. She probably never thought of it
as pleasant; it was only " never-to-be-too-much-
set-upon." Kallen 5 gives a good treatment of
immediate values as relations of the organism's
conscious activity to environment, but he wholly
disregards the contributory aspect of value.

5 Creative Intelligence, 412 ff.

106 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

§ ii. In Chapter III, the cognitive and feel-
ing sides of conscious activity were spoken of
as two directions in which that activity has
developed. They diverge from a point at which
conscious activity conies into contact with en-
vironment. At only one point in the develop-
ment of the organism is this divergence from
an undifferentiated conscious activity to be ob-
served, namely, at the first appearance of con-
sciousness in an organism. But since the indi-
vidual comes into contact with new factors of
environment constantly, it becomes of interest
to inquire just how new relations with the new
objects are established.

It is quite conceivable that conscious activity,
a single function exhibiting two aspects, might
react to stimuli from the environment at one
time chiefly in one aspect, at another, chiefly in
another. That is, in the case of a mature con-
sciousness, we cannot speak with so great a
confidence of a recurrence of the primitive con-
dition of conscious activity whenever a new con-
tact with environment is established. Our doubt
is confirmed by comparing the functions of other
organs and organisms. In plants, for example,
we find a great variety of highly developed

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 107

organs which serve special adaptive purposes.
The organs which perform these functions took
their origin from cells whose protoplasm was ex-
ceedingly sensitive to a great variety of stimuli.
But when once certain cambial cells become
differentiated into root, stem, leaf, or repro-
ductive cells, it is usually very hard to change
their direction of development. Of course there
are exceptions : some of the hepatics have a gen-
erous susceptibility to regeneration from vege-
tative cells, and we all know how the shoots of
some trees may be stuck into the ground with
the result that root cells become differentiated
from the cambium, and a tree grows up. The
latter example, of course, only shows the un-
differentiated character of cambial tissue; old
cells seldom change their function.

Now the fact that conscious activity has two
aspects which fluctuate in preponderance shows
that the sensitive character of consciousness is
not determined in growth along one hard and
fast line. And yet this is not to say that
primitive conscious activity must necessarily be
reenacted every time consciousness is stimulated
by a new environmental factor. Conscious ac-
tivity might be just fluid enough to respond to

108 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

some stimuli on the cognitive side, and to others
on the feeling side. It is extremely difficult to
describe what I mean in simple language. Per-
haps a very imperfect illustration may aid me.
Imagine two insulated wires wound together,
but connected at one end. These may represent
the two aspects of conscious activity taking their
origin at a point where there is no differentiation
into aspects, but continuing together inseparably
after differentiation has taken place. The point
of connection, however, is not the only connec-
tion with environment. Connection occurs at
many places along the line. The question is:
Is the connection with new points made by each
of the wound wires touching the environment
at various points, or by a wire at each point that
touches the new factor and immediately divides
into two wires that make connection with the
main wires?

It may seem that I am asking questions which
I ought not to ask in view of my disapproval of
disputes as to whether we can attend without
feeling or feel without attending. This is not
so, however. It is not a question of what con-
scious activity can do, but of how the environ-
ment comes into connection with conscious ac-

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 109

tivity. Frankly, I do not know how this real
question may be answered. I do not know how
to apply scientific method in such a case, and I
am sure that the method of introspection would
be quite inadequate, because one cannot even
observe the feeling side of consciousness when
that aspect is not predominant and exhibited in
consciousness by pleasantness or unpleasantness.
At least I may be permitted to speculate on
the matter. The basis for my own belief is my
view of the nature of the earliest stage of con-
sciousness. I do not believe in James's " bloom-
ing, buzzing confusion." It seems to me that
this is far too complicated for the earliest stage
of consciousness. It would better describe a
mature state of conscious activity which never
had a chance to function in some strange envi-
ronment into which it was suddenly plunged.
Nor do I believe that " pure sensations " are
entirely "simple" (in the sense of single). I
believe that the earliest stage of conscious activ-
ity is a situation where at least two factors are
discriminated and the feeling side is present,
though very rudimentary. (I have read some-
where that Esquimaux brought to Broadway,
New York City, did not seem alarmed by the

no VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

buzzing confusion, but were quite unconcerned
until they saw some skins hanging in a furrier's
window. )

It seems probable to me that, when a new
factor of environment comes into contact with
conscious activity, something of the same nature
occurs. If it does, it is so quickly connected
with memory images and the affective stream
that to notice it, even in its cognitive aspect, is
almost impossible. For this point of contact
with environment, realized at the origin of con-
scious activity, and again realized over and over,
as new factors of environment come into relation
with consciousness, I know no better term than
" sensation," which may be considered in this
connection to include the affective element (sen-
tire means almost anything in the way of per-
ception or affection). When sensation occurs,
the sensitive protoplasm delays in its course be-
fore responding to a stimulus; a moment passes
and it blossoms out into cognition and affection,
and is associated with accumulated memory
images in the main stream. Sensation, thus
considered, would be the bridge between cog-
nition and feeling.

§ 12. New values, therefore, the outcome of

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE in

new relations with environment, do not conflict
with old values in respect to their origin. But
they are modified by old values almost as soon
as they appear. If this were not so, but if, on
the contrary, new values retained their complete
independence, we should be very inconsistent in
our views of life. We are "that, and it is just
because we have systems of value-relations that
are more or less isolated one from another that
we are so. This inconsistency may be trivial,
or it may reach to abnormal proportions where
dissociation of personality occurs.

§ 13. So far as value is concerned, we may
see that the advantage of a mature conscious-
ness over the earliest stage of consciousness lies
in the ability of the former to control new values
by means of registered memory-images. This
control, I believe, though direct proof would be
difficult, also comes about by reference of new
affective elements to the affective side of mature
conscious activity. But the main control is
through ideas; and one chief element of the
process of " gaining experience " is learning to
control feelings by ideas. The experience of
the primitive organism is narrower because the
cognitive elements are simpler.

ii2 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

§ 14. A corollary, requiring no proof, is that
value-relations with the same objects change
according as the objects are found useful in
new ways, or as feeling-attitudes toward them
change.

§15. No proof also is needed for this corol-
lary: Every object with which conscious activ-
ity is in relation is of both contributory and
immediate value, but there is no constant ratio
between the contributory and immediate values
which exist by the relation of conscious activity
to any one object.

Chapter V may be summarized as follows:
I. Environment.

§ 1. The word "environment" in our dis-
cussion will be limited in its use to the sur-
roundings of an animal organism.

§ 2. Environment will designate that part of
the world with which an organism comes into
direct contact.

§ 3. Whether the contrast between man and
his environment is to be thought of wholly from
the biological point of view depends upon one's
philosophical predisposition.

(a) The materialist and the instrumental

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 113

pragmatist preserve the biological point of view
intact.

(b) Those who make a difference between
the mental and the non-mental may make the
contrast psychological, biological, or psycho-
physical.

(c) Spiritualists would give varying an-
swers, depending upon the degree of " objec-
tivity " which they attribute to the physical
world.

§ 4. In man, conscious activity may still be
described in terms of the standpoint of the
organism without trespassing beyond the bio-
logical aspect.

§ 5. This viewpoint is nearest like that of
the instrumental pragmatists, with two reserva-
tions :

(a) I do not commit myself to a decision
as to whether the physical world is certain or
uncertain in quantity.

(b) The cognitive aspect of conscious ac-
tivity must not be minimized.

§ 6. Our use of " environment " is practical,
rather than scrupulously exact.

§ 7. In discussing the contrast between man
and his environment from the biological point

H4 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

of view, we must take care not to conceive con-
sciousness as epiphenomenal, or to divide con-
scious activity into " faculties."

§ 8. Conscious activity is always one in op-
eration, but it has two distinct aspects, one of
which is generally more prominent than the
other.

§ 9. Conscious activity is related to envi-
ronment as directly through its feeling-aspect
as through cognition. Some practical conse-
quences.

II. Environment and Values.

§ 10. Everything with which conscious ac-
tivity comes into contact is valuable from both
the contributory and the immediate points of
view.

§ 11. It is probably true that, both in the
case of the origin of conscious activity and in
the case of contact of an existing conscious
activity with new factors of environment, sensa-
tion is the bridge between cognition and feeling.

§ 12. New values do not conflict with old
values so far as origin is concerned, but the
former are modified by the latter.

§ 13. The advantage of a mature conscious-

WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 115

ness over the earliest stage of consciousness, so
far as value is concerned, is the ability of the
former to control new values on the basis of
past experience.

§ 14. Value-relations with the same objects
change according as the objects are found useful
in new ways, or as feeling-attitudes toward them
change.

§ 15. Every object with which conscious ac-
tivity is in relation, is of both contributory and
immediate value; but there is no constant ratio
between the contributory and immediate values
that exist by virtue of the relation of conscious
activity to any one object.

PART II
WINDELBAND'S THEORY OF NORMS

CHAPTER VI

SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE

THE terms " subjective " and " objec-
tive," applied to values, have pro-
voked much discussion. They may be
used in a variety of ways, and a part of the
diversity of opinion that prevails among value-
philosophers is due to their slippery nature.
As values are relations of interest between
conscious activity and environment, both con-
sciousness and environment are factors in the
experiencing of values. I might think chiefly
of the objects valued, and say that all values
are objective; or I might think chiefly of my
conscious activity which forms or finds values,
and say that all values are subjective. There
is no room for dispute when the words are used
in so general a way.

Correct application of the terms is not so
easy, however, if I inquire which term of a
value-relation functions chiefly in the formation
of the relation. I then ask, " What makes a
certain object valuable? Is it valuable because

119

9

120 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

it contains within itself the power to enter into
a value-relation? Or is it valuable because my
conscious activity has the power to draw it into
such a relation ? Do I make it valuable, or does
it compel me to recognize that it is valuable ? "

I find objects to be of contributory value
when they serve certain ends. They seem to
have functions within themselves. A crowbar
is good for raising a stone because it has quali-
ties of strength and rigidity that permit of its
being used as a lever. Food is good for nour-
ishment because it contains substances which
have the ability to replenish energy in animal
cells. Such contributory values certainly owe
their being to functions of the objects valued,
and it is natural to speak of such values as
" objective."

Other contributory values have been fixed in
an arbitrary way. Save for a general agree-
ment among men, a dollar bill would not be
good for the purchase of a certain quantity of
a commodity. Here the value of the bill is not
inherent in the nature of the piece of paper with
a certain form of printing on it; the power of
purchase is not a function of the object as such.
And yet, when men have agreed that a dollar

SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 121

bill shall have a definite purchasing value, the
power of purchase has become a function of
the object. Therefore we may call economic
values objective, also.

Judgments were found to be contributory.
They have the power of putting those who make
them or those who learn them into touch with
their environment in such a way that conscious
activity makes progress when it judges, as it
could not if it did not judge. Judgments, there-
fore, have functions which they perform. They
may also be considered to be objective.

All contributory values may be termed objec-
tive. But a question arises when we come to
consider immediate values. Are the things that
I like, want, demand, and feel-toward, valuable
because the things themselves possess the func-
tion of satisfying my wants and demands? I
like peaches. Now peaches, considered as a
food, good for rebuilding bodily tissues, are of
contributory value. But there is another kind
of value associated with peaches, when I con-
sider simply my liking. I may like them; an-
other person may dislike them. They would
serve as wholesome food for each of us. The
contributory aspect must not be confused with

122 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

another aspect of value, that of my taste for
them. Is this taste objective? Do the peaches
draw me irresistibly to themselves, or do I go
to them because my conscious activity has a
peach-loving quality?

Most persons will agree that tastes for certain
foods go with the individual, rather than with
the object. They will agree that some imme-
diate values are not objective, but subjective.
There are certain groups of values, however,
which stand in doubt. Is a work of art beau-
tiful because I have a taste that appreciates it,
although others might not agree with my taste?
Or is it beautiful because it conforms to a norm
of beauty quite independent of my taste, and to
which I am compelled to give assent ? Are cer-
tain actions that I contemplate right because I
think of them in that way, or because they con-
form to standards of right that appeal to my
conscience ?

An analogous question arises in the case of
" secondary qualities/' Are these objective in
the Lockian sense? 1 Or are they, not " powers

1 Cf. Locke, John, Bssay concerning Human Understanding,
II, VIII, § 23 : " The power that is in any body, by reason of its
insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on
any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas
of several colors, sounds, smells, tastes, &c."

SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 123

in the object," but merely the forms in which
primary qualities clothe themselves in conscious
activity? Of course the answer to this ques-
tion is quite independent of that to the question
whether immediate values are subjective or ob-
jective.

Rickert, Windelband, and others believe that
not only in the moral and aesthetic spheres, but
also in the logical sphere, there are to be found
immediate values objective in character. They
argue that facts imply judgments, that feeling
enters into the determination of facts, and that
truth is an objective, logical norm. Some of
the inconsistencies of Rickert's position have
already been discussed.2 The standpoint that
recognition of truth is, in the last analysis, inde-
pendent of inference and perceptual phenomena
is of great assistance to those who would argue
for the objective character of immediate values
in the moral and aesthetic spheres. If it be
true that existence is dependent upon knowledge
(metaphysics upon epistemology, the Kantian
position), reality and "immediate truth" are
the same, and the permanent character of the
logical norms will argue for the permanent char-

2 Chapter II.

124 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

acter of norms in other regions. Through much
of the following discussion it is impossible not
to feel that the battle is often against a ghost
that has already been laid — the phantom of
Kantian epistemology. And yet, how effectu-
ally it has been laid is open to doubt when we
read these words of a recent writer: "All that
ought to be common property since the days
of Kant and Fichte, and every new time only
demands a new adjustment of these funda-
mental insights to the changing knowledge of
the period.,, 3

The attractiveness of the position that there
are objective immediate values seems to me to
lie, not in the support of the theory by Kantian
epistemology, but in the facts ( i ) that the theory
sets forth a teleological order of progress and
gives permanence to man's ideals, (2) that there
is associated with it the conception of a power
in nature superior to the blind forces whose out-
come is natural selection, (3) that under the
theory man is able to take part in world-develop-
ment, and (4) that conscience and responsibility
are explained as directed toward actions that
are of more than contingent import.

3 Munsterberg, The Eternal Values, 49.

SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 125

In my endeavor to determine whether there
are objective immediate values, I shall choose
for careful analysis the work of a representa-
tive of the objective point of view. Rickert's
treatment of the subject is most acute from
the logical standpoint, but it is academic and
does not afford the broad outlook of Windel-
band's. I shall therefore examine Windel-
band's arguments, as contained in the two
essays of " Praeludien," entitled, " Immanuel
Kant " 4 and " Normen und Naturgesetze." 5

4 Windelband, Wilhelm, Immanuel Kant, in Praeludien, 5U3 ed.,
1915, I, 1 12-146.

5 Windelband, Wilhelm, Normen und Naturgesetze, ibid., II,
59-98.

CHAPTER VII

THE THEORY OF NORMS

WINDELBAND'S interest in the prob-
lem of immediate values is incidental
to his interest in the problem of free-
dom of the will.1 He seeks a theory which will
allow freedom and which, at the same time, will
admit within its scope the deterministic forces
which operate in nature. The problem of free-
dom, in turn, is resolved into the problem of the
nature of accountability.2 Unless we felt that
we were accountable for our actions, we should
never have the sense of acting freely.

Accountability, according to Windelband, is
present not only in the moral field, but also in
the fields of thought and feeling.3 In the latter,
it is independent of any expectation of reward
or punishment, and may there be studied in
its purity. One feels that there are commands
which one ought to obey, from which, in the
actual process of thought and feeling, he often
deviates. There is not only a moral conscience,

1 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 59.

2 Id., II, 60.
*Id.} II, 64.

126

THE THEORY OF NORMS 127

but also a logical and an aesthetic conscience.4
Man feels a duty and an obligation to fulfil
the commands given him in the three fields.
Windelband's explanation of this triple con-
science is that it serves a pedagogical purpose 5
in leading men to follow those rules or norms
of thinking, feeling, and willing which are char-
acterized by their inherent importance over all
other ways of thinking, willing, and feeling.
These rules are norms whose realization in
human nature we are gradually approaching by
a kind of elimination comparable to, but not
identical with, the law of natural selection.6
The feeling of obligation, or duty, is the push
that we receive in the direction of fulfilling a
normal demand, the nature of the push being
an attraction from the norm itself.7 The feel-
ing of accountability arises when we realize that
our characters and nothing else are the cause of
our thoughts, actions, and feelings, and remorse
arises if we feel pain in the knowledge that we
could not have acted differently from the way
in which we did act.8

*Id., 11,67. 5Id., II, 95-

*Id., II, 74- "Id., II, 80.

8 Id., II, 94-

128 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

I shall divide my discussion of Windelband's
position into a number of sections, as follows:

I. Kant or Realism?
II. Evolution and the Norms.

III. The Parallel between Denken, Fuhlen, and

Wollen.

IV. Independence of the Norms from Par-

ticular Consciousnesses.
V. Freedom and Responsibility.

I. KANT OR REALISM?
Windelband, in common with others who de-
fend an objective theory of immediate value,
founds his argument on what he believes to be
basic principles of philosophy achieved once and
for all by the Kantian criticism. The essay
Immanuel Kant is in praise of Kant's critical
view over the older Greek view of knowledge
as a subject-object relation. In statement of
my view, I cannot do better than to refer again
to the essay The Emancipation of Metaphysics
from Epistemology, by Walter T. Marvin, in
The New Realism.9 The particular portion of
Marvin's argument which I wish to employ in

9 The New Realism, New York, 1912, pp. 43-95-

THE THEORY OF NORMS 129

my criticism of Windelband is that expressed
in the title of the fourth chapter of his essay,
" Epistemology does not give, but presupposes,
a theory of reality."

The argument of Marvin is with reference
to the whole Kantian epistemology. I wish to
show, however, that, after accepting the Kantian
standpoint, Windelband does not keep to it con-
sistently, but places the norms against a realistic
background.

§ 1. In the essay Immanuel Kant,10 he says,
" The truth is that Kant has denned as the
problem of philosophy reflection on the basis
of the principles of Reason, i.e., the absolute
norms, and that this reflection, far from being
exhausted by the rules of thinking, only finds
its conclusion through the rules of willing and
feeling.,, This is to say that the frame in
which our experience is cast consists of norms
of willing and feeling as well as norms of think-
ing. Taken all together, the norms constitute
the rules of all possible experience.

In the essay Normen und Naturgesetze, how-
ever, we find quite a different conception of
norms. Here 1X Windelband contrasts the laws

10 Windelband, Praeludien, I, 141. lx Id., II, 72.

130 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

of nature with the norms. Having previously
denned laws of nature in Kantian fashion as
" those general judgments about the succession
of psychical events, in which we recognize the
existence of psychical activity, and from which
we are able to derive the separate facts of the
psychical life," 12 he speaks of the operation of
the norms as only partly identical with the oper-
ation of the laws of nature.13 He says:

All norms are thus special forms of the realization
of natural laws. The system of norms represents a
selection out of the infinite manifoldness of the forms
of combination under which, according to the individual
circumstances, the natural laws of the psychical life can
unfold themselves. The laws of logic are a selection
from the possible forms of the association of ideas;
the laws of ethics are a selection from the possible forms
of motivation; the laws of aesthetics are a selection
from the possible forms of feeling activity.

In this essay, norms appear as a selection from
a manifold of possible — and actual — experi-
ences; in the former essay, they are the con-
ditions of any possible experience at all. This
change of viewpoint, however, necessitates drop-

12 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 65. 13 Id., II, 72.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 131

ping the Kantian conception of norms as the
framework of all possible experience, and shift-
ing the conception to that of norms operating
against a background of laws of nature.

§ 2. Windelband might regard the laws of
nature as the Kantian framework and the norms
as additional laws existing together with them
and exerting a selective influence which is felt
in the individual through the triple conscience.
In point of fact, however, he steadfastly re-
gards the norms as identical with the Kantian
" Regeln." His treatment brings out the diffi-
culty of the Kantian position in the matter of
defining truth. Where reality is simply the
experienced, the conception of a mechanistic reg-
ulation must work equally well in false as in true
judgments. And where Regeln of willing and
feeling are united with those of thinking, as
conditions of possible experience, " truth " is
applied to all experience (in some way). Win-
delband says, " Thus, in the greatest philoso-
phers, science recognizes by her side the ethical
and the aesthetic sense as determining factors
of the highest truth." 14 Truth here is consid-
ered to have epistemological reference to all

14 Id., I, 141.

132 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

the elements of experience. In the other essay,
however, it is the logical norms alone which have
the " Zweck der Wahrheit." 15 It is again evi-
dent that the possible content of experience is
here thought of as consisting of more than the
known.

§ 3. The difficulty of Windelband's theory of
norms in its relation to the Kantian Regeln is
also brought out in his discussion of the inde-
pendence of the norms from particular con-
sciousnesses.16 He is right in his thesis that it
is not necessary for the individual in whom the
norms are working to be aware of the fact, if
the norms are Kantian Regeln] but how will
they be any more present if the individual is
conscious of them? It is not the consciousness
or the lack of consciousness of the norms that
primarily causes the trouble, but the position
that there can be degrees of presence, or, rather,
that there can ever be absence. The difficulty
of the Kantian position in general in explaining
why it is that the Regeln are consciously present
as Regeln to so few persons is a different objec-
tion — one that is discussed by A. J. Balfour in

15 Windelband, Praeludien. II, 84.

16 Id., I, 83.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 133

A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, Chapter VI.
To say that norms exist independently of any
particular consciousness, in the full sense of
independence, would be Kantian suicide.

The considerations which I have adduced
seem to me to make it evident that Windelband
has at least unconsciously modified the Kantian
position in his treatment of norms. He seems
to adopt a position of " naive realism " ; the
norms and the laws of nature must work to-
gether in reality. In giving up the full Kantian
point of view, Windelband's theory loses some
of the plausibility that it gained when the norms
were presented in the guise of epistemological
necessity, but the theory remains an attractive
one. We are now compelled to assume that
norms have a metaphysical existence; and, once
this is done, there is always the possibility of a
pre-established harmony between the psychic and
the cosmic processes. I am not sure whether
such a possibility can be disproved. The safe
line of argument, the one adopted here, is to
show that, unless the assumption of the meta-
physical existence of norms is made at the start,
the arguments advanced to establish that exist-
ence fail.

134 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

II. EVOLUTION AND THE NORMS
§ 4. Windelband assumes that the world is
actually the world that science describes to us.
It has objective being; the law of causation is
its binding principle. It is a deterministic uni-
verse in the sense that the causal series described
by science is the actual one and the only one
possible. The causal sequence of nature tends
to become known to man by natural processes.
Man is able to observe, and to infer the nature
of the factors of evolution which have led to
the present result.

Especially conspicuous to man is the inequal-
ity which exists between the factors of evolu-
tion. The development of the whole is pur-
posive in the direction of the triumph of the
most weighty factors. Nature is conceived as
a mass of activities of which some few are des-
tined to survive, either because of their fitness
in the struggle for existence (by natural selec-
tion) or because of their inherent importance.
Windelband observes that some of the psychical
factors which are of inherent importance also
aid in the struggle for existence, as for ex-
ample, cleverness, and - the transcendental laws
of thought.17 But he notes that others, such as

THE THEORY OF NORMS 135

the moral and aesthetic factors, are of indiffer-
ent value in the struggle for existence and are
often positively detrimental. He accounts for
their persistence by saying that they must have
an inherent importance.18 A distinction between
factors of quantitative importance in the physi-
cal world and norms of qualitative importance
in the psychical world would bring out Windel-
band's meaning.

Strictly speaking, the comparison between
physical and psychical factors in evolution is
not a parallel. The world is a unity, and the
field of struggle the same for each group of
factors. (The unity here is the fact that there
is only one evolution in the physical world.)
The working out of the causal process produces
a great variety of organisms and psychical char-
acters. The important characters become fixed
gradually by the weeding out of the others.
The wide variation in importance between the
different characters necessitates the elimination
of the less important characters. Saying that
there is a difference of " importance " is ex-
pressed in another way by saying that nature
is purposeful in developing certain characters

17 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 76 ff. « Id., II, 80.

10

136 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

at the expense of certain others. These im-
portant factors, as we have seen, are of a differ-
ent nature in the physical and psychical worlds.
The most pregnant criticism of such a view
of evolution lies in a consideration of its work-
ability. The difficulty rests in the incompati-
bility of two sets of factors: factors whose
survival-value is determined by their quanti-
tative strength, and factors whose importance
is due to a qualitative intensity. Windelband
observes that, at the present stage of evolution,
these factors are often in opposition, and, one
may ask, what hope is there of a reconciliation?
Sooner or later there must be a reckoning; and,
judging from the fact that the realization of
psychical factors is dependent upon the presence
of favorable physical processes, we should infer
that, no matter how qualitatively important the
psychical factors may be, the latter will always
be at the mercy of the former. The persistence
of psychical development up to the present time
argues for its persistence and co-existence with
the physical in the future ; but Windelband needs
to show by what natural process the realization
of the norms is assured. " Inherent impor-
tance " is insufficient.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 137

To me it seems that it makes no difference
how closely the two sets of factors may be asso-
ciated. A particular case of " right-and-its-
circumstances " would, under the theory, have
a greater survival-value than other groups of
circumstances not containing " right." But it
is not conceivable that the circumstances asso-
ciated with right should always contain quanti-
tative factoral preeminence. Therefore, it would
have to be the qualitative factor often that
effected the survival-value, and there would be
bound to be the clash between quantitative and
qualitative factors which I have described.

III. THE PARALLEL BETWEEN DEN-
KEN, FUHLEN, AND WOLLEN

A. The Parallel between Dbnken and
WOLLBN
§ 5. Windelband says that, just as in Denken
there is but one correct thought, so in Wollen
there is but one right action.19 This, however,
is no true parallel. " Thing-to-be-thought " is
made parallel with " moral decision " ; the true
parallel would be between " thing-to-be-thought "

19 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 63 ff.

138 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

and " thing- to-be-done." But there is never one
objective action which is right independently of
the doer; there is no right or wrong with refer-
ence to the matter of moral decision. Buying
two $5 seats at the opera is not right or wrong
in itself, but for a particular person under par-
ticular circumstances.

The fault of the parallel is in the supposition
that there is the same possibility of latitude in
thought as in action. We should be obliged to
think according to the Kantian norms, if they
exist. Parallel with such norms would be norms
of willing which would compel us to act in ways
regulated by them. In either case there is no
choice open to us, no case where the norms
might not operate.

The Kantian epistemology has no place for
incorrect thinking. According to it, objects of
consciousness are particular groupings of em-
pirical representations according to the laws of
the understanding. Incorrect thinking, accord-
ing to some of Kant's followers, is unclear
arrangement of our perceptions. I ask whether,
when we are compelled to make a moral de-
cision, of the various alternatives presented,
one, the moral, attracts us because it is so much
clearer than any other?

THE THEORY OF NORMS 139

§ 6. Windelband's theory, in that it assures
independence of one another to the several
series of norms, unwarrantably isolates cog-
nition, feeling, and will. Thought, aesthetic
feeling, and moral decision may well be taken
as types of highest development of these " fac-
ulties"; but, even in their highest develop-
ment, they can never become independent. The
grounds of this objection are found in two con-
siderations, (a) Windelband speaks of truth
as the " end " of thought. " End," however,
is a word used properly only where activity is
present. As long as there is thought-activity,
so long must the active (will) element be asso-
ciated with the cognitive. Complete disassoci-
ation would be possible only in the case of
absolute passivity of thought, a condition which
would be indistinguishable from unconscious-
ness, (b) If the norms of moral decision were
independent of those of cognition, we should
have a situation where moral laws were present
without any matter on which they might act;
or the matter of moral decisions would be that
of empirical representations. The former sup-
position is absurd; under the latter, it would
be necessary for the perceptions to be arranged

140 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

in consciousness according to the laws of the
understanding, before they could be of service
for moral decision. In such a case, the norms
of morality would be dependent on the logical
norms.

B. The Relation of Fuhlbn to Dun ken

AND WOLLEN

I shall discuss this portion of the subject
together with the following section.

IV. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
NORMS OF PARTICULAR CON-
SCIOUSNESSES
Windelband constantly writes as if he believed
that the norms were operating in a world of
matter and motion. This presupposition leads
him to try to prove that they exist quite inde-
pendently of particular consciousnesses.20 In
his proof, he makes much of the very portion
of the Kantian position which has been assailed
most vigorously, namely, the varying degree to
which the norms are present to the conscious-
ness of individuals. The fact that most men
have but a hazy idea of norms of truth, beauty,

20 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 81 ff.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 141

and morality is taken to argue for independent,
objective existence. Before presenting Windel-
band's arguments, it may be asked whether the
independent, objective existence of norms which
may at one time not be present to the conscious-
ness of a particular individual, and again at
another time may be present, does not pre-
suppose that there are objective entities which
may pass to and from the knowing situation?
And if so, is not this to take away from con-
sciousness the sole privilege of organizing the
material of empirical representations? Does
not this lead to realism?

A. Single Laws of Logic, Morality, and
Beauty

It is argued that the norms, when actualized,
exist independently of the consciousness in which
the actualization occurs. Windelband presents
two proofs, the one based on our judgment of
their actualization in others, the other derived
from our appreciation of their actualization in
ourselves.

§ 7. Norms are independent of the conscious-
ness of the one in whom they are actualized
because we give our approval or disapproval to

142 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

such a one whether or not he is conscious of
such a realization in himself.21

This argument is most plausible in the case
of Denken. If we assume a realistic back-
ground and the current presuppositions of sci-
ence, we think of facts and the relations between
facts as quite valid no matter whether there
exist any perceiving consciousness at all. If
we superimpose an idealistic epistemology, we
still grant that the existence of a stable world
stands or falls by the constancy and similarity
of factual impressions.

The case of Wollen, however, is different.
That we are loath to give actions independent
of conscious moral decision any ethical value so
far as the agent is concerned, is shown by the
fact that we do not grant that such actions have
moral merit. Our praise or blame in such cases
is the result of comparison with our own stand-
ards. Without this comparison, there would
be no " beautiful souls " who act morally from
nature. I do not mean that, if the absolute
value of our own moral standards be granted,
such " souls " are not beautiful, but that, with-
out recognition of their beauty by us, they would

21 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 8l.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 143

have no moral value whatever. It is useless for
Windelband to show that moral actions may be
independent of the consciousness of the agent,
unless he can also show that they are independ-
ent of the consciousness of others at the same
time. And what we assume as to independent
existence in the case of the objects of thought,
is insuperably difficult if applied to the case of
moral laws, where divergence of opinion is so
wide. Without any implication that moral laws
and aesthetic judgments stand upon a similar
basis, we may say that the same argument ap-
plies equally well to the consideration of uncon-
scious creation of beauty.

§ 8. Some norms may excite approval or
disapproval in the consciousness of the agent
upon realization, without their actually being
present to his consciousness.22

We can create a beautiful object or appreciate
a work of art without thinking of aesthetic
norms, which are rules of criticism. This is
very true. But in his desire to avoid a sub-
jectivistic basis of logic and ethic, Windelband
has overreached himself a little in applying the
same arguments to aesthetic. In the case of

22 Id., II, 83.

144 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

aesthetic judgments, there is a simple explana-
tion of the phenomenon which he mentions,
which entirely obviates the necessity of attrib-
uting independence of consciousness to the
norms. According to this view, aesthetic pleas-
ure originates only when a cognitive element
of consciousness stresses one aspect of feeling
over other aspects. The more attention that is
paid to special features of the object appreci-
ated, and the more these special features are
associated with other ideas in the mind, the
greater the development of aesthetic feeling.
Aesthetic rules may be formed upon introspec-
tion, but they are merely the coming to self-
consciousness of cognitive elements which were
already present, although so tied up with the
feeling elements that they were not separately
recognized. Of course we do not need to have
rules in order to feel beauty. Rules are the
outcome of reflection over shades of feeling.
But it is also true that the study of some aes-
thetic system will aid very materially in later
combinations of cognition and feeling in aes-
thetic appreciation. One is not born a com-
poser of beautiful music. No matter what may
be the extent of the gift of musical feeling, it

THE THEORY OF NORMS 145

is necessary that the cognitive elements of har-
mony be learned by hearing good music in which
the harmony is present, and generally by a study
of theory. Beethoven, born on an island where
no music was ever heard, would likely have
beaten a drum.

In the case of aesthetic feeling, Windelband
argued from the truth that artistic creation and
aesthetic appreciation do not demand conscious-
ness of norms of beauty. But this apparent
independence does not hold true of logical and
moral norms, as Windelband himself admits.
Here, he says, the norms are concerned with the
" deciding moment " 23 in the process, and so
are of the very greatest value to the conscious-
ness of the agent. We are not likely to perform
a moral act, unless we are conscious of a stand-
ard of morality in deference to which we choose
to act in one way rather than in another!

B. Realms of Laws of Logic, Morality,

and Beauty

It may be objected, in reply to my criticism of

Windelband's parallel between Denken, Fuhlen,

and Wollen, that it is difficult to demonstrate

23 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 84.

146 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

paiallelism between single laws of thought,
single moral decisions, and single appreciations
of beauty; but that it would be easier to defend
the existence of three realms of laws of logic,
morality, and beauty. Perhaps the inconsist-
ency of the parallel is only apparent, and results
from a different kind of relation of each of the
realms to an individual, rather than from the
point of view of the three realms themselves.

It is puzzling to know how we are to conceive
the three realms of norms. In what does their
objectivity consist? If we adopt the Kantian
standpoint, we might consider a moral norm
objective in the same sense that the laws of the
understanding are objective. The moral norm
in question would accompany the logical laws
by which the whole situation is conceived, and
the whole would be a " right-situation.,, But
this objectivity would not be ontological, but
epistemological.

From the standpoint of realism, it is possible
to assume that there is a pre-established har-
mony between the psychological recognition of
a right action and an objective " right " in-
herent in a teleological universe — however the
inherent " right " may collide at times with fac-

THE THEORY OF NORMS 147

tors of natural selection. This position, how-
ever, is one that Windelband does not adopt.
He is anxious to put the norms on the same
footing with the laws of nature, and makes his
appeal to the Kantian standpoint.

§ 9. In order to show that there are three
realms of norms influencing the logical, moral,
and aesthetic " faculties " of man, it is neces-
sary to demonstrate that there is a choice pre-
sented, and that the norms point toward an
action, thought, or feeling which would not be
indicated clearly without them. Windelband's
effort to prove the existence of such a choice is
made in connection with his attempted demon-
stration of a moral, a logical, and an aesthetic
conscience, and with his belief that the factors
operating in natural selection are inadequate to
explain the facts.

(a) He claims that the existence of a moral
conscience in individuals cannot be accounted
for by the law of survival.24 For, he says, in
order to effect a moral purpose, a man can use
only a part of the means at his disposal. Other
possible actions are forbidden him. Further-
more, the older a civilization grows, the less

24 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 77.

148 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

moral it becomes, a fact which shows that nat-
ural selection does not operate here in choosing
a factor of permanent advantage.25 But he says
that in the case of nations the moral value is
identical with the survival value.

It seems to me that this argument overlooks
a whole field of inquiry, in which moral con-
science has been described in wholly psycho-
logical terms. Man became conscious of actions
that were at first instinctive, and the memory
of previous actions furnished circumstances to
be considered by the side of later actions. Com-
pare, for example, J. S. Mill's description of
conscience.26 This theory is strengthened in
consideration of the fact that consciences are
so different, resting as they do upon different
psychological equipments. Moral conscience
would seem to be a very imperfect instrument
whose function it is to indicate our needs with
reference to action. It would be easier to argue
for metaphysical objectivity, if we found more
uniformity in moral consciences. Moral laws,
framed at first in accordance with instincts,
might well have been possessed of survival value

25 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 79.

26 Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism, Everyman ed., New York, 1910,
p. 26.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 149

for primitive man. Windelband seems to be
under the impression that survival-values, to be
such, must be operative through the whole of
their existence — which is not true.

(b) Moreover, Windelband's argument by
the use of the term " moral decision " is faulty.
When we speak of moral decision, we have
emerged from the strictly psychological field of
inquiry into the logical field. Moral decision,
however quickly we may make it, is a matter
of judgment. Moral choice is the outcome of
deliberation (Aristotle). In his discussion of
conscience in evolution and moral decision, it
seems to me that Windelband has deviated from
the point at issue. We are trying to determine
whether there is ontological objectivity in an
action that is felt as right. Moral decision,
brought about by standards of right, the out-
come of education, is concerned with mediate,
not immediate values. If there are such onto-
logical entities as moral norms, they must oper-
ate immediately, in the case of felt right; as,
for instance, when I feel that such and such an
action is right in itself.

Now when I become introspective, I do not
find any feeling of conscience immediately in-

150 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

dining me to a way of acting. I find no actions
which seem right or wrong in themselves. In
every case where conscience enters, I find that
I have been weighing possible actions, however
brief may have been the process. I find my-
self discriminating between different interests.
Therefore, I cannot help concluding that actions
in themselves are indifferent, and that moral
distinctions are mediate. It is true that I am
inclined to follow instincts, but I cannot find
any moral quality as distinguished from instinct.
I may say that moral distinctions grew out of
my instincts, but nothing leads me to suppose
that the distinctions themselves are anything
but derivative. And, inasmuch as actions are
meaningless from the standpoint of morality,
when divorced from choice and deliberation, I
conclude that the ontological objectivity of moral
norms can only be defended by the supposition
of a pre-established harmony.

§ 10. Windelband says that logical norms
lead us to truth.27 Now from the Kantian
standpoint this position is more easily defended
than from that of realism. If logical laws and
physical phenomena are all considered epistemo-

27 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 84.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 151

logically, one may be objective in the same sense
as the other. There is some difficulty in dis-
covering any epistemological falsity at all, how-
ever, for everything just is.

But Windelband uses the Kantian argument
to make his position plausible at the start. Then
he switches over to the Lockian conception of
knowledge as true knowledge. According to
the latter conception, he thinks of the psycho-
logical processes as having a great number of
possibilities of association of " ideas " in vari-
ous ways in any one situation. That which
leads the mind to prefer one over all the other
possibilities is the quality of normality which
it possesses. Thus the norms of thought are
neither identical with nor contrary to the gen-
eral laws of association of ideas. I do not see
how we can admit these possibilities of associ-
ation if we keep to the Kantian standpoint.
According to Kant, we have to think according
to these laws. I repeat, the position of Windel-
band here is more in accord with Locke, and
we must consider the matter in connection with
the implied realistic background.

Where is truth? If it is the real as the object
of judgment, as the realists tell us, I cannot see
11

152 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

where logical norms are demanded. In such a
case, we should be led to truth simply by what,
in the last analysis, is perception — of objects
and relations. To suppose the existence of
norms would be to believe that there is a special
conspiracy on the part of nature to bring organic
beings into harmony with it from their psycho-
logical standpoint. From the standpoint of evo-
lution this would be a hysteron proteron; and it
would render natural selection useless. If, on
the other hand, truth is in the judgment, it would
seem to be mediate, insofar as there is presented
the possibility of a number of judgments. But
a logical truth of this kind, based on inference,
is something quite different from immediate ap-
proval of a correct thought. And logical truth
ultimately traces back to perceptual phenomena,
unless an idealistic complication is introduced.
I cannot, therefore, see the necessity of suppos-
ing ontologically objective norms of thinking.
Epistemologically, they may be defended (with
a problem as to the nature of the false idea).
§ ii. The strongest argument for ontologi-
cal objectivity is found in the case of so-called
aesthetic norms. We recall James's discussion
of the place of afTectional facts.28 Beauty, as

28 James, William, Essays in Radical Empiricism, 137-154.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 153

well as color and secondary qualities in general,
can be thought of as a quality of the object.
A beautiful vase so functions as to produce a
feeling of immediate pleasure. I cannot prove
that the beauty is entirely subjective any more
than I can prove that secondary, or even pri-
mary, qualities are entirely subjective. The
pleasure of beauty may be only incidental.
Why, then, does it seem more reasonable, ac-
cording to my view, to consider the beauty as
wholly psychological?

Windelband says that one reason for con-
sidering aesthetic norms objective is the fact
that aesthetic appreciations cannot be accounted
for on the basis of their survival by a process
of natural selection.29 He implies that there
would be no need of supposing the existence of
these norms, if such an account could be given.
He says that, although it is true that there has
been a gradual development of the nervous sys-
tem in the case of organic nature, it is also true
that the over-development of aesthetic ability is
apt to be weakening, rather than strengthening.

Now it seems to me that the preservation of
aesthetic capabilities may be accounted for by

29 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 79.

154 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

natural selection. It has been observed that our
aesthetic appreciations and our laws of beauty
follow closely along the line of the structure of
natural objects. Those organisms which har-
monized with their environment would tend to
survive. This would not preclude the possi-
bility of later aesthetic development beyond the
point of usefulness of the aesthetic factor as a
survival value. A quite theoretical volume of
appreciations might survive, for evolution casts
off only dangerous developments, not harmless
ones. If over-refinement led to weakness, the
survival-value would assert itself on occasion.
The primitive colors carry with them more
aesthetic delight to an uncultured people than
the more delicate shades. The rare colors give
pleasure only to the " highbrow." Primitive
colors, furthermore, are associated with many
objects which have survival-reference. The
warm colors, yellow and red, have pleasure
associated with them perhaps because of their
connection with the light of the sun and the
warmth of fires. Cold blue is associated with
the sea and sky; black, with the treacherous
night. Observe, too, that the same object of
appreciation may affect different individuals in

THE THEORY OF NORMS 155

wholly different ways. The general uniformity
of taste may be accounted for on the principle
of harmony of organic with inorganic nature.
Even so, beauty might be considered to be
ontologically objective. In such a case, nature
would have to be regarded as conspiring to give
aesthetic pleasure to some of its organic com-
ponents. Beauty, to be ontologically objective,
must be a principle in nature distinct from the
utility which operates in natural selection; that
is, it must be so, if we are ever to prove its
existence, for, of course, we might have faith
in eternal beauty without the least bit of evi-
dence to prove that it exists. However, the
psychological explanation seems to me to be
entirely adequate, and the proofs advanced to
establish an over-personal beauty seem incon-
clusive. Therefore, it seems wisest to adhere
to the simpler viewpoint.

V. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

§ 12. After having attempted to show how
norms and natural laws may fit into a single
system, Windelband seeks to remove the Kantian
dualism of a region of freedom and a region of
natural law. His method is a consideration of

156 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

the meaning of freedom. He aims to show-
that freedom and determinism are not incom-
patible. He says,

Freedom is the determination of the empirical con-
sciousness by consciousness of the norm. . . . This
freedom is in no wise a mysterious ability to do some-
thing for which no cause is present; it demands no
exception to the continuity determined by nature of the
phenomena of the life of the soul; but it is rather the
ripest product of natural necessity, that through which
the empirical consciousness places itself under the law
of the consciousness of the norm.30

Aside from the notion of norms, I find myself
in cordial agreement with Windelband in his
contention that freedom and determinism are
not incompatible. But Windelband seems to
feel that norms somehow help to a reconcilia-
tion, and in this I cannot agree with him. He
seems to feel that freedom can be explained as
a type of determination according to norms. It
appears to me that nature is here regarded as
static before possibilities of determination, on
the one hand, according to quantitative factors
of evolution, and, on the other, according to

so Windelband, Praeludien, II, 88.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 157

normal, qualitative factors. Now if the Kantian
dualism is to disappear, it seems most natural
that quantitative and normal factors should
work themselves out in a single system along
deterministic lines. The theory, however, shows
no reason why normal factors should prevail.
This was my first criticism of norms, here re-
peated with special reference to the discussion
of freedom.

I do not think that the reader of Windelband's
arguments will be satisfied with his definition of
freedom after a consideration of his subsequent
discussion. Windelband escapes the main prob-
lem of freedom by identifying freedom with a
certain kind of determined processes. A human
being cannot act outside of natural law in the
carrying out of any plan. The means at his
disposal are determined from the start; and, if
he follows out a certain course of action, there
is a chain of causation to whose links he must
conform. When Windelband places freedom
in a course of action determined according to
consciousness of a norm, he appears to place it
right in the causal series.

It may be seen, however, that the issue does
not lie here. Windelband speaks of the em-

158 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

pirical consciousness " placing itself " (sich
stellt) under the law of consciousness of the
norm. In the next sentence he defines freedom
as the " autonomy " with which the individual
consciousness makes of a norm, known and
recognized by it, a maxim of action. Now this
autonomy by which the individual consciousness
is able to put itself under the determination of
one of several possible courses of action is a
different sort of freedom from that of the pre-
ceding definition of freedom as the " determi-
nation of the empirical consciousness through
the consciousness of the norm." In the case of
the definition just quoted, nature is viewed as
a battlefield wherein different laws, natural and
normal, come into collision. The natural laws
war among themselves, and the issue is decided
by natural selection. The addition of norms
to the forms of the evolution-process merely
increases the number of laws which are at war.
Now I take it that there are degrees of power
among the factors of evolution, and that these
degrees of importance are constant throughout
the process of nature, so that there results a
causal continuity.

By Windelband's first definition, freedom

THE THEORY OF NORMS 159

would consist in the consciousness of the trans-
ference of the action of an individual from one
type of mechanistic series to another type of
mechanistic series. " Freedom is nothing other
than the consciousness of this determining power
which the known and recognized norm is able
to exercise over the thinking faculty and de-
cision of the will." I interpret this to mean
that norms are laws which exist only in relation
to conscious beings; that natural laws reign
supreme in inorganic nature; but that the indi-
vidual conscious being is able to escape from
the tyranny of an implacable mechanism by
placing himself under the rule of higher laws
which become operative only through the me-
dium of consciousness. Now the important
idea of this exposition is that consciousness
makes a difference in the deterministic course
of nature. Certain laws, norms, become oper-
ative only when organisms become conscious of
them. It is difficult, however, to see how aware-
ness of norms, however influential a factor it
may be, can itself be termed freedom, on the
plea that this factor of awareness initiates cer-
tain new deterministic lines. The awareness
simply becomes one new factor. This fits in

i6o VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

well with the argument for determinism, but it
ill accords with the admission of freedom. Free-
dom seems to have become identified with a
process of awareness.

The plausibility of Windelband's argument
seems to lie in the implicit assumption of another
kind of freedom for the individual in addition
to the one which he has defined. This second
kind of freedom is expressed by his use of the
words " autonomy " and " places itself." Free-
dom, according to this second conception, is
something within the factor of awareness, not
identical with it. Freedom is the ability of one
who is aware to accept or reject the normal way
of acting. Decision of the will is a decision
involving choice of action on the part of the one
who is aware. I do not feel that Windelband
has escaped the real problem of freedom by the
method which he has employed. The old dis-
cussion of whether the will is free comes again
to the fore; it has been buried only temporarily.
How can a conscious being " place himself "
under the rule of one of several kingdoms of
law? Windelband's only implied answer is,
" Through being conscious." He seems to feel
that it is the peculiar glory of a conscious being

THE THEORY OF NORMS 161

to be able to make selective choice of factors
which shall govern his action. He seems to feel
that, by making norms part of a determined
system, he has made freedom intelligible. But
the real dispute, it seems to me, is not over the
question as to how courses of action work out
(as, for instance, whether or not they are in
causal series), but over how the individual is
able to choose one course of action rather than
another, it being taken for granted that any
course is determined in the process. And I
cannot see how the introduction of norms helps
the situation at all. It only adds a complication
to the factoral-complex of possible actions —
about whose possibility it is mainly disputed.

This is no essay on determinism, indetermin-
ism, and freedom, but a discussion of the rela-
tion of Windelband's conception of norms to his
conception of freedom. I think that it has been
shown that the assumption of norms only em-
barrasses the discussion, and that without norms
we can as easily suppose several courses of
possible action, any one of which may be com-
pletely determined in the process. There is
nothing to be gained by printing one of these
courses of action in red letters!

162 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Windelband fears that his notion of freedom
will be challenged on the ground that it does not
do justice to the feeling of responsibility and to
the existence of responsibility in general.31 He
feels it important, therefore, to examine the
notion of responsibility. As he has been trying
to reconcile the concept of freedom with some
kind of determinism, it is not necessary to
reconcile responsibility with his theory of deter-
mination by norms. He feels that the crux of
the question lies in the admission that acts of
moral decision are caused. But, at the outset,
he finds that causation and responsibility are
not incompatible. In fact, if moral actions were
not caused, there could be no responsibility; all
would be mere chance. We are only respon-
sible when we cause our actions. Wherein,
then, lies our feeling of repugnance in the mat-
ter of making responsibility contain causation?
Windelband feels that it lies in the notion of
necessity which we must attribute to cause and
effect, if causation is to have any " objective
character." He proceeds to analyze the con-
cept of necessity (as distinguished from the
time-relation of succession, discussed by Hume)

31 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 88.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 163

into two meanings. One of these, the meaning
of Wirkens, " power," is not further discussed.
The other is said to be that of logical dependence
of the special on the general, Gesetzmassigkeit,
" according-to-lawness." 32 Now our repugnance
in the matter of admitting causation into the
conception of responsibility is evidently a feel-
ing that Gesetzmassigkeit destroys freedom.
Windelband quotes the work of Rickert in con-
nection with the analysis of Ursachlichkeit, to
the effect that many acts which are caused do
not have a general law behind them. Such
are all individual actions which never recur
under exactly the same conditions. Therefore,
Gesetzmassigkeit and Ursachlichkeit are not
co-extensive; and, if this be true, responsibility
would sometimes have to do with causal rela-
tions which are not predetermined according to
a general law. Windelband does not examine
Rickert's arguments, but passes to a consider-
ation as to where one finds the idea of necessary
connection in the case of unique actions. He
says that a man's willing and acting are caused
by his character.33 The obedience to law in the

32 Id., II, 90.

33 Id., II, 92.

164 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

case of unique actions is found in the nature of
character which sets forth a logical law of gen-
eral nature; viz., if the circumstances were to
be repeated (whether they are actually repeated
or not), the man would act thus and so. Thus,
"all effecting (Wirksamkeit) has epistemologi-
cal meaning, and the logical form of Gesetz-
massigkeit, even if its factual non-repetition or
inability to be repeated excludes methodologi-
cally its comparison with other examples." 34
Therefore, the causal relation is never present
without Gesetzm'dssigkeit , even if this be only
epistemological.

It is somewhat puzzling to gather the precise
significance which Windelband wishes us to
attach to his analysis of causation. If Rickert's
position were sound, causation would be relieved
of some of the burden imposed on it by deter-
minism; and responsibility would be affected
similarly by a softening of the conception of
causality. Windelband, however, feels the need
of retaining the notion of necessary connection
in some sense, and he endeavors to soften the
sense of Gesetzmassigkeit. This he does by
showing that, in cases of unique action, obedi-

34 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 92.

THE THEORY OF NORMS 165

ence to law is only to be understood epistemo-
logically. Supporting himself on the Kantian
epistemology, Windelband is able to juggle terms
between the laws of phenomena and logical laws,
with an ontological implication that, as the one
realm is as real as the other, it is permissible to
take from each in building up a theory.

My criticism of the analysis of causation is
that it is not to the point. It is certainly true
that the causal relation exists between the act
of moral decision and the subsequent action that
is carried out, but the question is as to whether
the causal relation exists between the norm and
the act of decision. We may represent the
matter more clearly by the use of symbols. Let
n stand for norm, b for the act of moral decision
of a conscious being, c for the subsequent action,
R for relation, and C for causal. Now my
position is that responsibility certainly involves
b — RC — c. This is well established by Windel-
band. The important question, however, is not
what kind of causal relation this may be, but
whether there is another causal relation between
n and b; is n — RC — b true, in other words?
Windelband escapes consideration of this prob-
lem by using the ambiguous term " character "

166 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

to cover both the norm and the act of decision,
nb. He thinks that the difficulty connected with
causation is settled by showing that nb — RC — c.
But the matter is not settled by saying that
" character determines willing and acting." He
proves that an act of moral decision determines
a subsequent action, by virtue of the " charac-
ter " of the agent, and then assumes that there
is no question as to determination within " char-
acter," which contains at least the important
elements of the act of moral decision and the
presence of the norm.

The point at issue is, Does the presence of
the norm in the " character " determine the act
of decision? This question can not be discussed
without coming dangerously near assuming the
discarded notion of " states of consciousness."
A more psychological statement of the point at
issue would be, Has a conscious being ability to
reject or accept or choose between conscious
impulses? This is the question whose answer
is the answer as to whether man has freedom
or not.

This question is discussed subsequently by
Windelband, and I shall criticize his treatment
of it. He says that another objection brought

THE THEORY OF NORMS 167

against the association of responsibility with
causal necessity in the case of willing and act-
ing, is the fact that, by popular usage, respon-
sibility always implies the belief that a man
could have acted otherwise than he really did
act.35 Whereupon Windelband answers that the
possibility of a variety of actions in a situation
is true only of man " in abstracto " ; that a man
" in concreto " could act otherwise only if he
were otherwise. It is because his character is
such as it is and because it has caused certain
actions that we judge a man responsible for
what he has done.

Windelband here expressly denies that a man
has any choice of possible actions. With it he
implies that a man has no choice of possible
decisions. The latter denial, to my mind, is
the denial of the only kind of freedom that is
worth anything. Observe two things. Note
the confusion running through the argument
with respect to willing and acting. Windel-
band's original discussion had to do with the
parallel between Denken, Wollen, and Fuhlen.
Now, when he is temporarily discussing Wollen
alone, a stranger has made his appearance,

35 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 93.
12

168 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Handeln. We now read of Wollen and Han-
deln. They are spoken of in the same breath,
and it is just because of this juxtaposition that
Windelband can profit by his confusion between
an act of decision of the will (Wollen) and the
physical process (Handeln) which follows the
act of decision.

Observe, in the second place, that responsi-
bility as interpreted by Windelband is here
brought in to prove that a man has no choice
of possible actions. This goes well if we take
it literally: a man can be responsible only for a
causally determined action. But how can he be
responsible for an act of decision if it be caus-
ally determined? If an act of decision of the
will is the effect of a determining cause, respon-
sibility for the decision must rest with the cause,
not with the man himself.

Windelband has said that a man cannot act
otherwise than is determined by his character.
His proof, as we have seen, relies upon use of
the term " character " in an ambiguous sense.
The difficulty in the matter of application of
responsibility to the cause is now discussed by
him as a new difficulty. He now asks, What
is responsible for the character: circumstances,

THE THEORY OF NORMS r6Q

society, or God? How can the individual be
responsible for his character? " Als ob es noch
irgendwie auszudenken ware, was das Indi-
viduum im Unterschiede von seinem Charakter
noch sein konnte!"3* In such a case, Windel-
band says, a man's character would have to be
doubled; he would have to have an empirical
and an intelligible character, and thus we should
have a metaphysical conception which would not
agree with the causal element of the conception
of responsibility. Windelband's solution is to
locate responsibility in the judgment whereby
we transfer our approval or disapproval of a
function to the individual who functions.37

Windelband's main problem was to reconcile
freedom with determinism. He found that, in
order to do so, he would have to give an account
of responsibility which would do full justice to
it. His method was to show that causation and
responsibility are not incompatible. We should
suppose that he would find responsibility some-
where in the series of causation, but he discovers
that the problem of infinite regress is involved.
He therefore concludes that, although causation
in moral action is always associated with respon-

36 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 94. 37 Id., II, 95.

170 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

sibility, responsibility is only applied metaphor-
ically to the person; that it is only a way of
passing judgment on a portion of the causal
series; that itself it is not a part of the causal
series at all. How does this agree with Win-
delband's method of showing that responsibility
is not incompatible with determinism by norms
on the ground that responsibility always involves
the notion of causation ? If this notion of caus-
ation is found ultimately to be of only meta-
phorical application, has the objection to Win-
delband's definition of freedom been removed
by the location of a metaphorical causation in
responsibility ?

As to his objection that a man's character
would have to be doubled in order to make it
possible for him to change his character, I would
reply that there is no more a problem here than
there is in the facts that a conscious being pre-
serves the memory of former experiences, or
that one can make a judgment of approval or
disapproval. The problem is contained in the
question as to whether he can ever decide in
favor of the less prominent factor.

Windelband, as we have seen, has finally
located responsibility in the judgment, and he

THE THEORY OF NORMS 171

believes that it is a great pedagogical means of
getting oneself and others into the way of obedi-
ence to norms. These laws, by their " inherent
importance," are destined ultimately to prevail,
and responsibility is one factor in the process by
which they reach supremacy in the lives of indi-
viduals. If it were not for Windelband's appli-
cation of the term " responsibility " to persons
rather than to functions, I should be inclined
to suppose that responsibility, like norms, was
taken to be one more factor in the evolutionary
process. He may, indeed, regard it in this light.
Judgments, then, would be determined, and we
should have here simply a case of a very prag-
matic function of the intellect in cooperation
with the rest of the order of nature. But the
memory of Windelband's use of the expressions
" autonomy " and " places itself," together with
his apparent belief that responsibility is not
entirely a delusive thing, leads me to wonder
whether he does not, in effect, locate freedom
in the judgment. Does he not assume (though
it is out of harmony with his arguments) that
we can approve or disapprove according to our
will, and that we can put ourselves under the
rule of one or another set of factors? That we

172 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

can teach others by our exercise of judgment of
their actions? That we can do this in some
real sense and not merely in conformity with a
causal process?

Unless something of this sort is felt by
Windelband, I cannot see how the ethical sig-
nificance of his doctrine is other than " laissez
faire." If we have no real ability to bring the
norms to bear on our lives and the lives of others,
but just take part in the whole process of evolu-
tion, with responsibility as a natural phenom-
enon at work with the other factors, responsi-
bility can be no more than a very involuntary
pedagogical instrument, and the less mankind
knows about Windelband's theory the better —
that is, if it is not true!

Windelband's general position is character-
ized by passivity on the part of the individual
to the forces which shape the course of develop-
ment of body and mind. To be sure, he defends
moral decision, and describes man as struggling
upward, but the more powerful the attraction
from the norms and the more merciless the evo-
lutionary factors, the more evident it becomes
that, so far as man is concerned, his battle is

THE THEORY OF NORMS 173

only a sham battle after all. Now that we have
shown that obligation and responsibility cannot
serve the pedagogical purpose which Windel-
band ascribes to them, they become a mockery
to life. We look over the universe, and, indeed,
we see duty and responsibility as factors in the
world-process, but the teleological goal toward
which we are moving seems to contain all the
life-activity within itself. The whole world
seems as if it were being pulled toward that
high goal. The struggle is between more and
less powerful factors in the process. We feel
that in Windelband's view human beings are
the tools of factors.

Without the support of any philosophy, one
feels the need of a view of the universe by which
he may take some part in the struggle, and help
toward the attainment of the goal. The pop-
ular idea of moral responsibility has some such
background as this. We feel that the individual
ought to have the means of doing some of the
eliminating. We feel that a deterministic world
is but one side of the truth.

Although nothing in the previous discussion
offer a basis for belief in such a different kind
of universe, we may at least feel encouraged

174 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

that it is not without the bounds of possibility,
if Windelband's theory has been proved incon-
sistent and untenable.

CONCLUSION

THE course of our discussion has led
from the definition of two classes of
values, immediate and contributory,
and the discovery of their psychological basis in
feeling and cognition, to a description of their
natural history. First their origin in the earli-
est stages of consciousness was described. The
two types of valuing were held to signify two
divergent directions of development of con-
scious activity. It was emphasized, however,
that neither of these ever occurs in isolation
from the other, but that, rather, one was more
prominent at a given time than the other.

Next the relation of the judgment to values
was discussed. In the act itself, it was found
that all judgments are contributory. The value
of the content of the judgment, however, de-
pends upon the future usefulness of the content.
All true judgments were found to be contribu-
tory as to content, and also certain false judg-
ments. The comparatively small group of judg-
ments of value was treated briefly. It was noted
that immediate values first find expression in

175

176 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

the judgment, and that the expression of con-
tributory values grows out of judgments of
immediate values. At a subsequent stage of
development, however, contributory values be-
come free from previous cognition of the means
as immediate values.

Chapter V carried on the natural history of
values by discussing their interrelation. This
topic concerned the relation of the individual to
his environment through the expansion of his
interests. The biological point of view was
adhered to, and it was discovered that con-
scious activity is related to environment directly
through feeling and cognition. Thereupon it
was shown how everything with which con-
scious activity comes into contact is valuable
both from the immediate and from the con-
tributory points of view. Some practical con-
sequences of this fact were deduced.

Early in our discussion (Chapter II), we dis-
posed of a theory which claimed to prove the
existence of ontologically objective norms of
truth. Part II examined in detail Windelband's
theory of norms. The writer believes that he
has proved that Windelband's position, in spite
of its containing broad and suggestive state-

CONCLUSION 177

ments, is self-contradictory, confused in outline,
and untenable. It is desirable, in conclusion, to
indicate our attitude toward those moral and
aesthetic values which are so commonly recog-
nized by human beings.

We must bear in mind that we seek an in-
terpretation that is psychological and biological.
All values and standards of value, it is true, in-
asmuch as they are entities of one kind or
another, must have their place in a metaphysical
account of the universe. But throughout this
book it has been our care to disentangle the
psychological and the biological from the meta-
physical, and to deal with only the former. In
a complete account of values, the metaphysical
side must not be neglected, but we have not at-
tempted to give a complete account. Our attack
on Windelband's position is not so much an
attack on the theory that there are ontologically
objective norms of thinking, willing, and feel-
ing, as an attack on the attempt to demonstrate
the existence of such norms from psychological
data.

We have referred to J. S. Mill's description of
conscience1. This description is an excellent

1 Page 148.

178 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

psychological account of the growth of stan-
dards of moral value. It runs as follows :

The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard
of duty may be, is one and the same — a feeling in our
own mind ; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on vio-
lation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures
rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it
as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested,
and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and
not with some particular form of it, or with any of the
merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Con-
science; though in that complex phenomenon as it
actually exists, the simple fact is in general all encrusted
over with collateral associations, derived from sym-
pathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the
forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of
childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem,
desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even

self-abasement Its binding force, however,

consists in the existence of a mass of feeling which must
be broken through in order to do what violates our
standard of right, and which, if we do nevertheless
violate that standard, will probably have to be encoun-
tered afterwards in the form of remorse. Whatever
theory we have of the nature or origin of conscience,
this is what essentially constitutes it.

In terms of our theory of values it is evident
that any individual act demanded by conscience
in view of a standard of morality is related to

CONCLUSION 179

consciousness in two ways. First there is the
feeling-aspect. Mill well describes how the feel-
ing commonly called "conscience" arises as the
consequence of certain inhibitions and asso-
ciated ideas. While the peculiar character of
the feeling of conscience is thus dependent upon
the matter to which the feeling is attached, it is
no less true that, as one aspect of the relation
of the individual to the act, the feeling of con-
science, like other feelings, is a relation of im-
mediate value. Obedience to the dictate of con-
science brings with it a feeling of pleasure; dis-
obedience results in a feeling of the unpleasant.
The associated matter has not changed feeling
to something new and original; it has merely
heightened and intensified it.

In the second place, any act the fulfilment of
which is demanded by conscience, is related to
consciousness also on the cognitive side. Here
must be taken into account moral judgment.
Any act that is the outcome of a decision in view
of some moral standard and is not merely a
habitual response prompted by some former de-
cision, involves moral choice and deliberation.
Here there is a rivalry among possible courses
of action, and some principle of action emerges.

180 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Such principles are always judgments of values.
What A. J. Balfour2 calls "subordinate ethical
propositions" are judgments of contributory
values3. "I ought to make a true statement in
this particular instance" may be subordinate to
the "fundamental" ethical proposition "I ought
to speak the truth." The fundamental propo-
sition, however, is a judgment of immediate
value. The word "ought" simply indicates that
the feeling of liking is associated with a group
of psychological factors in such a way that we
name it a feeling of obligation.

Two correlated topics require brief mention.
First, the psychological processes involved in the
formation of standards do not necessitate our
consideration. They are identical with the de-
velopment of concepts as described in any
elementary psychology. Secondly, the point of
view that we have adopted in no wise conflicts
with the logical account of ethical propositions

2 A. J. Balfour, A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, 342.

3 If it be objected that the "subordinate" ethical propo-
sition contains the word "ought" as well as the "funda-
mental" proposition, and that therefore it too is a judgment
of immediate value, let it be remembered that we defined
an immediate value as a given good, "intrinsic, self-sufficient"
(page 8). According to Mr. Balfour's definition of a "sub-
ordinate" ethical proposition, the ought of such a proposition
is not self-sufficient, but ever dependent upon the intrinsic
ought of its "fundamental" proposition.

CONCLUSION 181

given so acutely by Balfour. In reference to
the fundamental ethical proposition, we do not
have to explain why we have such immediate
values, any more than we have to explain why
there are such entities as value relations at all.
It is interesting, however, to observe that
logically, if certain statements of obligation are
a priori, so also is there a contributory factor
present in every a priori statement of obligation.
"I ought to speak the truth" means — if it have
any meaning at all for any individual — "I ought
to say words that are contributory to truth-
telling.,,

There are two principal methods of investi-
gation of aesthetic facts which are pursued by
philosophers of aesthetics. One method is satis-
fied with a wholly empirical, psychological treat-
ment of the facts of appreciation of the beautiful
as exhibited in individuals and races. A phil-
osopher who finds his whole interest in this
standpoint will be concerned with questions re-
lating to the origin and development of such
appreciations. I have already suggested4 that
natural selection may be a potent factor in the

4 Pages 153-154-

182 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

determination of what is recognized as beauti-
ful. Among cultured persons, however, the
great mass of aesthetic appreciations has lost its
survival-reference. Just how far this is true
would be a matter for empirical investigation.
An empirical inquiry will also be concerned with
an investigation of such principles as may be
found to underlie the "secondary" systems of
later development. Throughout the whole
course of an empirical treatment, it should be
borne in mind that, psychologically speaking,
the aesthetic experience is one of feeling, not of
cognition. But an empirical account will pass
beyond a mere assignment of experiences to a
particular aspect of consciousness, to a con-
sideration of the cognitive elements to which the
feeling-experiences are attached. Only on this
basis are we justified in introducing such sub-
jects as relation to natural selection, develop-
ment of aesthetic standards, etc. If an em-
pirical account is to be given, however, let it be
wholly empirical, and let care be taken not to
allow metaphysical assumptions to creep into the
discussion.

On the other hand, quite a different treatment
is possible. The aesthetic philosopher may con-

CONCLUSION 183

sider the metaphysical significance of the em-
pirical facts of aesthetic appreciation. The
psychological investigator need not be hostile to
his metaphysical coworker; he would better be
his friend. But it should be understood that the
two methods are quite separate and distinct.
What, then are the principles according to which
the aesthetic metaphysician shall proceed ?

They are the same as those employed by other
metaphysical philosophers. In our day there
has been much protest against the cut and dried
systems of the older philosophers, and a cor-
responding satisfaction in everything that pre-
tends to empiricism. I believe, however, that the
only justification of this point of view lies in the
facts that classical metaphysics had at its dis-
posal fewer scientific facts than are now avail-
able, and that it often was willing to neglect such
facts as were then known. With a sober view of
the known facts, however, it is still a legitimate
human impulse to want to transcend the facts
in some measure and to ground the contingent
in what is permanent. The philosophic impulse
of Rickert and Windelband must be recognized
as valid and admirable ; fault is to be found only
with their method — their attempt to deduce
metaphysical truths from psychological data.
13

184 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

The problem of a satisfactory and valid
method in metaphysical research would seem to
resolve itself into the question of how to utilize
empirical data without utilizing them wrongly.
We may make the following suggestions: Let
the metaphysican frankly base his system upon
a dogmatism. Let him announce his faith in
the "real" existence of what he cannot prove to
exist in the way in which he assumes its exis-
tence. Let him work out to the full all the im-
plications that arise from his assumptions. But
he should not be content to rest his faith in arbi-
trary assumptions, even though he must neces-
sarily be arbitrary in the act of assuming. He
should look over the body of facts that are
known in his particular field. Then let him
make bold guesses as to some trans-empirical
reference of certain of the facts of observation.

It may be objected that any dogmatic method
is a waste of time because it can never reach
ascertainable facts. Against the objection it
may be urged that, empirically speaking, it is a
human impulse to want to transcend the facts,
and that, indeed, the roots of all scientific re-
search are embedded in metaphysical assump-
tions. It is entirely possible, also, that, in the

CONCLUSION 185

future, some metaphysical system may be ac-
cepted generally as being more comprehensive
than any other, in view of all the facts known
in every field of human experience. The build-
ing of many systems, therefore, would be con-
tributory to the formulation of such an inclusive
system. While inclusiveness would not be a
guarantee of truth, such a system, nevertheless,
might claim the same degree of certainty as that
attained in the formulation of laws of nature.

There is, therefore, a wide field of investi-
gation in ethic and aesthetic for the meta-
physician to explore. If he be frank and sincere
as to the element of dogmatism in his system,
there is no reason why he might not attempt to
correlate a realm of norms of beauty with a
realm of ethical values. Let him, however, not
attempt to extend expirical data from psy-
chology and biology into a trans-empirical realm
of being, without recognizing the necessity of
dogmatism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED *

Balfour, Arthur James.

A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, being an
essay on the Foundations of Belief. By Arthur
James Balfour, M.A., M.P. London. Mac-
millan and Co. 1879. . . .

Bergson, Henri.

Creative Evolution. By Henri Bergson. .
. . Authorized translation by Arthur Mitchell,
Ph.D. New York. Henry Holt and Company.
1911.

Dewey, John.

Essays in Experimental Logic. By John
Dewey. The University of Chicago Press.
Chicago, Illinois. [1916.]

James, William.

Essays in Radical Empiricism. By William

James. Longmans, Green, and Co

New York. . . . 1912.

1 A good general bibliography of the subject of values is
to be found in The Philosophical Status of Values, by J. E.
Dashiell, 1913. New York (Columbia dissertation). Cf. the
citations in Valuation, Its Nature and Laws, by W. M. Urban,
1909, London and New York.

187

188 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Locke, John.

An Essay concerning Human Understanding.
By John Locke. Collated and annotated, with
Prolegomena, biographical, critical, and his-
torical, by Alexander Campbell Fraser. . . .
In two volumes. . . . Oxford at the Claren-
don Press. M. DCCC. XCIV.

Kallen, Horace M.

Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art, and
Religion. By Horace M. Kallen.

Being pages 409-467 in:

Creative Intelligence. Essays in the Prag-
matic Attitude. By John Dewey, Addison W.
Moore, Harold Chapman Brown, George H.
Mead, Boyd H. Bode, Henry Waldgrave Stuart,
James Hayden Tufts, Horace M. Kallen. New
York. Henry Holt and Company. [191 7.]

Marvin, Walter T.

The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epis-
temology. By Walter T. Marvin.

Being pages 48-95 in:

The New Realism. Cooperative Studies in
Philosophy. By Edwin B. Holt, Walter T.
Marvin, William Pepperrell Montague, Ralph

BIBLIOGRAPHY 189

Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin, and Edward
Gleason Spaulding. New York. The Mac-
millan Company. 19 12. . . .

Mill, John Stuart.

Utilitarianism. By John Stuart Mill. Four-
teenth impression. Longmans, Green and Co.
. . . London, New York and Bombay. 1901.

MUNSTERBERG, HUGO.

The Eternal Values by Hugo Munsterberg.
Boston and New York. Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany. The Riverside Press. Cambridge. 1909.

RlCKERT, HEINRICH.

Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Einfuhrung
in die Transzendentalphilosophie. Von Hein-
rich Rickert, Professor an der Universitat
Freiburg i. B. Zweite, verbesserte und er-
weiterte Auflage. Tubingen und Leipzig.
. . 1904.

Russell, Bertrand.

Our Knowledge of the External World as a
Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. By
Bertrand Russell, M.A., F.R.S. . . . The

■igo VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Open Court Publishing Company. Chicago.
London. . . . 1914.

Titchener, Edward Bradford.

Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of
Feeling and Attention. By Edward Bradford
Titchener. New York. The Macmillan Com-
pany. 1908. . . .

WlNDELBAND, WlLHELM.

Praludien. Aufsatze und Reden zur Phil-
osophic und ihrer Geschichte. Von Wilhelm
Windelband. Funfte, erweiterte Auflage.
[Two volumes.] . . . Tubingen.

1915.

INDEX

Accountability, 126-127 ; see
Responsibility.

Act, judgment in the, 54, *57-
59, *66-67.

Actualization of norms, 141.

Additive character of judg-
ments, 73.

Agent; see Standpoint of indi-
vidual.

Aesthetic values: subjective
or objective? 16, 122; their
presence to individual con-
sciousness, 143-145 ; argu-
ment for their objectivity,
152-155; empirical and meta-
physical treatment of, 181-
183.

Affection, Wundt's dimensions
of, 95-

Allegory, use of, 71.

Anthropocentric attitude re-
jected, 37-38.

Appreciation in relation to
valuation, 22.

Aristotle, 149.

Aspects of conscious activity
never isolated, *I2, 41, 50,
*96-98, 104.

Association, 151.

Attention and feeling, 94-96.

"Autonomy," 160, 171.

Awareness of norms, 159.

Balfour, Arthur James, 132-
133, 180.

Beauty: subjective or objec-
tive? 16; see Feeling,
Aesthetic.

Beethoven, 145.

Bergson, 51; (implied refer-
ence to,) 101.

Biological concomitants of
values, *37, 88, 90.

Causal sequence of natural
phenomena, 134, 157.

Causation and responsibility,
162-172.

Cause : distinguished from
means and from con-
tributory values, 34; of
judgment in the act, *57, 66.

Character, Windelband's anal-
ysis of, 163-172.

Choice, said to be determined
by the functioning of norms,
147-150; see Freedom.

Civilization, growth of, in
reference to norms, 147-149.

Classification: of values, 7-8;
of disputed values, 15-16.

Clearness: a criterion of at-
tention, 95; a neo-Kantian
criterion of truth, 138.

Cognition : as psychological
basis of contributory values,
9; an aspect of conscious
activity, 96-98; and growth
of the environment, 99; and

191

192 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

aesthetics, 144-145; and con-
science, 179-180.

Cognitive elements: may be
different in memory from
the original perception, 50;
in relation to feeling, 91-92.

Colors, 154.

Concepts and standards of
value, 180.

Conscience, 124, 126-127, 148-
150, 177-180.

Consciousness : earliest stage
of, (r) in reference to
value, 36, 106, (2) in refer-
ence to the conditions which
cause us to ascribe value to
it, 37, 45 ff., (3) in reference
to its aspects, 97-98; and
environment, 88-89, 93-112;
one in its functioning, *97~
98, 108-109, 139, 166; mature
stage of, in; of individuals
with reference to norms,
132-133, 140-155-

Contact with environment: in
reference to interest, 64; in
reference to determination
of the environment, 86-87,
92-93; two aspects of, 94-
-112; new, 106-111.

Contemplation, 97.

Content: of judgments, 55, 59-
73; of false judgments, 67-
69.

Contributory: acts of judg-
ment are, 59; content of
judgment may be, 59 ff., con-
tributory judgments ex-
pressed in language, 80-83;
contributory relation of the

individual to environment,
104-112; contributory values
are objective, 119- 121; con-
tributory element in the
fundamental ethical propo-
sition, 181.

Creative Intelligence, 90.

Criteria of truth and value, 63.

Definitions, 62-63.

Degrees of contributory value,

65, 69-73.

Desire: object of, 78-83; end
of, 80-83.

Determinism, 42; its relation
to freedom, 155-172.

Dewey, John, 26.

Directions of the develop-
ment of conscious activity,
50.

Dissociation of personality,
in.

Dogmatism, 184-185.

Duty, 178.

Education, 149.

Ego-centric, 65.

Emphasis: different in the
several aspects of conscious
activity, 12.

Empirical account of aesthetic
values, 181-182.

"Empirical" consciousness, 158.

End: of judgments as values,
64, 68, 69; of desire ex-
pressed in judgment, 80-83;
of contributory values, 7-14,
120; of thought, 139.

Environment : simplest form
of, containing value-relation,

INDEX

193

45; growth of, 47; special,
of individual and race, 72-73 ;
definition of, 85-93 ; relation
of, to conscious activity, 98;
and values, 104-112.

Epiphenomenalism, 95-98.

Epistemology : in reference to
metaphysics, +24, 123, *I28-
133; in reference to the
psycho-physical problem, 88;
and truth, 131-132, 150-152,
idealistic, 142; and ob-
jectivity, 146; and obedience
to law, 164-165.

Error, explained with diffi-
culty in Kantian terms, *i3i-
132, 138, 151.

Esquimaux, 109-110.

Ethical propositions, 180.

Evolution: end of valuation
in, 64-65; and norms, 134-
137.

"Experience", gaining of, nr.

Expression of values: see
Language.

"Faculty-psychology" depre-
cated, 96-97; see Aspects.

False judgments may be con-
tributory, 60, 66-69.

Feeling: as basis of immediate
values, 10; in reference to
sensations and ideas, *45-
51, 91-92; expressed in lan-
guage, 79-80; and attention,
94-95; its part in conscious
experience, 95-104; see
Aesthetic, Conscience.

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 124.

Freedom, 126, +155-172.
Freedom, value in relation to,

1 19-125.
Future action and judgments,

59-73-

Goal of the universe, 173.
Hume, David, 162.

Idealism, 69.

Immediate values : self-suffi-
cient, 10; independent of
cognition, 35; arise out of
contributory values, 48; ex-
pressed in judgment, 78-80;
and relation of the indi-
vidual to his environment,
105-112; subjective or ob-
jective? 121-125.

Impulse : often associated
with feeling in immediate
values, 11-12; egoistic and
altruistic, 65.

Independence: of contributory
values, 13; of norms from
particular consciousnesses,
132-133, +140-155-

Inference : in reference to en-
vironment, 92-93 ; truth
alleged to be independent of,
123.

Instinct, 150.

Interactionism, 89.

Interest: incidental to truth of
judgments, 30, 64; necessary
to all valuation, 35 ; in refer-
ence to the origin of values,
*38 ff., 92; in reference to

194 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

judgment, 59, *67, 77, 79:
in reference to moral
choice, 150.
Interrelation of values, (1)
with respect to origin, 31-
53, (2) with respect to
knowledge, 54-84, (3) with
respect to co-existence, 85-

115.
Introspection, 95-98, 109.

Intuition, 101.

James, William, 26, 105, 109,
122, 151, 152.

Judgment: acts of, 57-59; con-
tent of, 59-73 5 and memory,
60; when present, 66-67;
and moral choice, 149-150;
and truth, 152; and respon-
sibility, 169-172; moral, 179-
180.

Judgments : are all of con-
tributory value, *i6-i7, 121 ;
existential, 23, 26, 65; not
essential to valuation, 10,
32-33 ; in reference to
standpoint, 54; as the
climax of development of
the cognitive function, 55;
as values, 56-76; true, *6i-
66, 131-132; false, *66-69,
131-132; of values, 70, *76-
83; origin of, 77-83; in form
of general propositions, 82-
83.

Kallen, Horace M., 105.
Kant, Immanuel, 123-124, 128-
133.

Knowledge: not essential to
the presence of values, 10,
32-33; the interrelation of
values with respect to, 54-
84; logical, the best instru-
ment for dealing with
reality, 99; not determined
by feeling, 100- 101.

Language, expression of

values in, 54-55, *76-83-
Laws of nature in reference

to norms, 129-133.
Locke, John, 122, 151.
Logical values so-called :

see Judgment, Knowledge,

Norms, Truth.

Marvin, Walter T., 24, 128-129.

Materialism, 88-89.

Matter of moral decisions,
137-140.

Metaphysical account of
values, 177, *i82-i85.

Method of metaphysical re-
search, 183-185.

Mill, John Stuart, 148, 177,
178:

Mind and body, 88-89, 172.

Moral values : subjective or
objective? 16, 122; and
natural selection, 137; paral-
leled by Windelband with
other norms, 137-140; and
moral decisions, 142-143,
148-150.

Miinsterberg, Hugo, 124.

Music, 144-145.

INDEX

195

Natural selection, 124, *I34-
137, *I47-I55, 158.

Necessity: of judgment, 22,
27 ; Windelband's analysis
of, 162-164.

Norms : Rickert's views of,
*20-30, 123 ; Windelband's
theory of, 126-174; denned,
126-127; relation to Kant,
128-133; and evolution, 134-
137; three kinds of, 137-140;
independence of, from par-
ticular consciousnesses, 132-
133, *i40-r5S; degrees of
presence of, 132, 140-141 ;
in reference to freedom and
responsibility, 155-172.

Ob j ective : in reference to in-
dependence, 14; meaning of,
1 19-123; attractiveness of
the theory of objective im-
mediate values, 124; see
Norms, Realms.

Obligation, feeling of, 180.

Observer: see Standpoint.

Opposition : removal of, in
Fuhlen, Denken, and Wol-
len, 29; overcoming of, by a
primitive organism, 40.

Origin: of values, 31-53; is
from the observer's stand-
point, 35; of judgments, 77-
83; of immediate values, 78-
80; of contributory values,
80-83.

"Ought," meaning of, 180.

Parallelism of realms of
norms: see Realms.

Perception: and judgment, 22,
28; and environment, 92-
93; and truth, 123, 152.

Permanence of content of
judgments as values, 60.

Plants, 106-107.

Pleasantness-unpleasantness,
95-104; the "dimension" of
feeling, 95; always present
in conscious activity, 96-98;
practical consequences of
our theory, 99-104; in refer-
ence to conscience, 178-179.

Practicality and judgments,

71-73.
Pragmatism, 88-92.
Pre-disposition, philosophical,

88-89.
Pre-established harmony, 133,

146, 150, 152, 155.
Protoplasm, 40, 87, no.
Psychology: basis of values

in, 10-12; concerned with

Sein, 24; and environment,

88-89; and conscience, 148.
Psycho-physical parallelism, 89,

95-98.
Purpose : expressions of, 81 ;

in nature, 135-136.

Qualitative and quantitative
importance of norms, 135-
137, 156-157.

Realism : in Windelband's

theory, *I29-I33, 140-141,

151 ; "naive," 133.
Reality : quantitative aspect of,

91 ; my contact with, *ioo-

104, 112.

196 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Realms of norms, 145-155.

Recognition, alleged to be a
factor in immediate valu-
ation, 20-21.

Reflection, feelings accom-
panying, 49.

Relation of false terms, 68-69.

Relations, real, 61-64.

Religion, 102-104.

Responsibility, 124, 126- 127,
*I55-I72.

Rickert, Heinrich, *2i-30, 100,
123, 125, 163, 183.

Russell, Bertrand, 26.

Secondary qualities, 122-123.

Selection and norms, 130-131.

Sensation: "simple," 46, 109;
a pragmatic use of, 91 ; in
reference to environment,
92-93; as not exhaustive of
the possibilities of relation
with the environment, 100;
definition of, no.

Situation, earliest value-, 38-42.

Sollen and Sein, 23 ff.
Spectator: see Standpoint.
Spiritualism, 89.
Standards of value, 177-178;
see Norms.

Standpoint: of individual (1)
defined, 34, (2) in expression
of values, 76; of observer
defined, 34; of individual
and observer compared as
methods, 44; in reference to
judgment, 54 ff. ; merging

of, in judgment, 55, 60, 70;
confusion of, by some
writers, 76; development of
the individual's, 104-112.

Stimuli: calling forth judg-
ment, 57 ; in reference to a
definition of environment,
87, 92-95, 106- 1 12.

Subjective: in reference to de-
pendence, 14; meaning of
the term, 1 19-122.

Survival-value, 136; see Nat-
ural.

Terms: and relations, 27-28;

of judgment, 60-73.
Theoretical judgments, 73.

Titchener, Edward Bradford,
94.

Truth: is it a value? 15, 123;
as immediate, 25 ; involves
inference, 26; of judgments
in reference to value, 60-66;
Kantian difficulty in refer-
ence to, 131 -132; and norms,
150-152.

Uncognized values, 34-35.

Unity of conscious activity:
see Aspects.

Usefulness of judgments: see
Contributory.

Value: relational character of,
9-10, 119; and truth, 63-66;
alteration of, 112; function
and, 1 19-120.

INDEX

197

Values: two classes of, 3-4, 7-
8; from standpoint of ob-
server are contributory, 43;
present in earliest stage of
consciousness, 48; acts of
judgment as, 57-59; content
of judgments as, 59-73; co-
existence of, 85-112; and
environment, 104-112; new,
iio-iii; see Aesthetic, Con-
tributory, Feeling, Inter-

relation, Judgment, Know-
ledge, Logical, Moral,
Norms, Origin.

Verification : of contributory
values, 13, 20; of judgments,
55, 61-62; implies the possi-
bility of false judgments, 69.

Windelband, Wilhelm, 126-174,
183.